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OF CHRISTMAS TREES AND CORPUS CHRISTI:
CEREMONIAL DEISM AND CHANGE IN
MEANING OVER TIME
B. JESSIE HILL†
ABSTRACT
Although the Supreme Court turned away an Establishment
Clause challenge to the words “under God” in the Pledge of
Allegiance in Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, the
issues raised by that case will not go away anytime soon. Legal
controversies over facially religious government speech have become
one of the most regular and prominent features of Establishment
Clause jurisprudence—and indeed, a second-round challenge to the
Pledge of Allegiance is currently percolating, which will likely result
in resolution by the Supreme Court. That resolution will depend on
an understanding of the social meaning of the practice at issue.
This Article addresses the constitutional analysis of “ceremonial
deism”—brief official religious references such as the words “under
God” in the Pledge of Allegiance, the national motto “In God We
Trust,” and the city names Corpus Christi and St. Louis. Courts have
generally stated in holdings and dicta that ceremonial deism is
constitutional because these phrases have lost their religious meaning
through the passage of time or rote repetition. To examine this
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claim—the “secularization” thesis—this Article draws on one
particular branch of linguistic theory, known as speech act theory, as
it applies to the problem of change in meaning over time. Because
speech act theory is particularly useful for the analysis of social
meaning, this Article contends that some insights about the problem
of ceremonial deism may be found there, lending depth to an
argument that has gone almost entirely untheorized by those who
have espoused it. Finally, this Article considers the implications of this
analysis for the constitutionality of these official religious references.
Ultimately, while recognizing that meaning can change over time in
some instances, this Article concludes that courts should be skeptical
of this claim and should instead adopt a rebuttable presumption of
enduring religious meaning when confronted with constitutional
challenges to instances of ceremonial deism.
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The past is never dead. It’s not even past.
– William Faulkner, REQUIEM FOR A NUN

1

QUESTION: . . . . [I]s it the Government’s position that the words,
under God, have the same meaning today as when they were first
inserted in the pledge?
MR. OLSON: Yes and no . . . .
QUESTION: Because it’s a terribly important question.
2

Oral argument, Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow

INTRODUCTION
The history of America’s national motto is in part a history of
wars, both real and cultural. “In God We Trust” first came to be
imprinted on coins in response to pleas like that from Reverend M.R.
3
Watkinson to the Secretary of the Treasury, Salmon P. Chase.
Writing in 1861, in the midst of the Civil War, Reverend Watkinson
exhorted: “What if our Republic were now shattered beyond
reconstruction. Would not the antiquaries of succeeding centuries
4
rightly reason from our past that we were a heathen nation.” What
was needed, he continued, was an inscription on American currency
that “would relieve us from the ignominy of heathenism” and “place
1. WILLIAM FAULKNER, REQUIEM FOR A NUN 92 (1951).
2. Transcript of Oral Argument at 19, Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S.
1 (2004) (No. 02-1624).
3. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Fact Sheet on the History of “In God We Trust,”
http://www.treas.gov/education/fact-sheets/currency/in-god-we-trust.shtml (last visited Nov. 1,
2009). Discussion of the history of the national motto and its inscription on currency may also
be found in ANSON PHELPS STOKES & LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED
STATES 568–71 (2d ed. 1964), and Steven B. Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionality of
Ceremonial Deism, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2083, 2122–24 (1996).
4. The Coin Library, In God We Trust on U.S. Coinage, http://www.coinlibrary.com/info/
ingodwetrust.html#Rev.%20Watkinson's%20Letter (last visited Nov. 1, 2009). The U.S.
Treasury website misquotes this letter. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, supra note 3 (“What if our
Republic were not shattered beyond reconstruction?”).
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us openly under the Divine protection we have personally claimed.”
After first appearing in 1864, “the motto was found missing from”
certain gold coins in 1907, but “[i]n response to a general demand,
Congress ordered it restored, and the Act of May 18, 1908, made it
6
mandatory on all coins upon which it had previously appeared.” The
7
phrase “In God We Trust” became the national motto in 1956.
The brief suspension of the motto’s inscription between 1907 and
1909 occurred because President Theodore Roosevelt commissioned
8
a new design for the coins that did not include the motto. The
president defended his decision on the ground that the use of such a
solemn motto on coins “comes dangerously close to sacrilege,”
tending to cheapen it and open it up to “jest and ridicule,” as in
9
phrases like “In God we trust for the [other] 8 cents.” The historical
evidence suggests, however, that the decision was aesthetic rather
10
than religious or constitutional in motive. In response to the ensuing
popular uproar, Congress passed a bill requiring that the motto
11
appear on coins again, and Roosevelt signed the bill. But it was not
until much later, in a frenzy of religious piety mixed with patriotism
not unlike that accompanying the motto’s initial appearance in the
Civil War era, that “In God We Trust” was finally adopted as the

5. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, supra note 3.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Willard B. Gatewood, Theodore Roosevelt and the Coinage Controversy, 18 AM. Q. 35,
37 (1966).
9. President Roosevelt’s statement defending the motto-less coins appeared in the New
York Times on November 14, 1907. Roosevelt Dropped ‘In God We Trust,’ N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14,
1907, at A1. In addition to making the argument about sacrilege, Roosevelt insisted that there
was no “legal warrant” for placing the motto on the coins. Id. It is unclear whether this was
because the legislation first providing for the motto’s inscription on currency authorized but did
not require it, STOKES & PFEFFER, supra note 3, at 568, or because the legislation was
inadvertently omitted from the Revised Statutes of 1874, Gatewood, supra note 8, at 40 & n.20.
10. Gatewood, supra note 8, at 37, 41.
11. Id. at 50.
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12

national motto. Around the same time, the Pledge of Allegiance was
13
amended to include the words “under God.”
Today, the American Family Association (AFA) sponsors a
campaign to put copies of the national motto in the public schools as
“a reminder of the historical centrality of God in the life of our
14
republic.” For a time, the AFA offered to provide a prototype
poster, free of charge, that contained the motto in large capital letters
15
on an American flag background. Seventeen state legislatures have
16
required such postings. And in 2000, the U.S. House of
Representatives overwhelmingly passed a resolution encouraging
17
display of the national motto in public buildings.
The history of the motto demonstrates in many ways the
dynamic concerning brief official references to religion—commonly
known as “ceremonial deism”—that is central to this Article’s
argument. It is a story about conflating the patriotic and the religious
as a means of consolidating a national identity and, simultaneously,
suppressing dissent. Both the introduction of the motto on coins and
its official adoption by the national government occurred in contexts
of religion-infused hypernationalism. Yet, it is also a story about the
historicity of language—its ability to convey different messages in
different historical contexts, from quasi-sacrilegious humor to a
sincere assertion of the supremacy of God over human affairs.
Finally, it is a story about the ability of language not only to describe

12. STOKES & PFEFFER, supra note 3, at 570; cf. ACLU v. City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265,
279 (7th Cir. 1985) (citing sources and noting that abolitionism and the Civil War stirred
religious sentiments, suggesting that the nation was more religious than it was at the Founding);
William Van Alstyne, Comment, Trends in the Supreme Court: Mr. Jefferson’s Crumbling Wall
— A Comment on Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984 DUKE L.J. 770, 786 (describing the combined
religious and patriotic fervor that prevailed both during the Civil War era and in the 1950s,
when the motto was officially adopted and the words “under God” were added to the Pledge).
13. The Pledge was amended in 1954. Act of June 14, 1954, ch. 297, Pub. L. No. 83-396, 68
Stat. 249; see also STOKES & PFEFFER, supra note 3, at 570–71 (describing how a sermon
attended by President Eisenhower in February 1954 spurred the Act’s speedy passage, with the
president signing it into law in May 1954).
14. Am. Family Ass’n, ‘In God We Trust’ Poster Campaign, http://www.afa.net/igwt/ (last
visited Nov. 1, 2009). I am grateful to Cassandra Robertson for bringing this website to my
attention.
15. Id. (describing the poster campaign and displaying an image of the poster).
16. Id. (follow “Click here to see if your state already has a law” hyperlink). Those states
are Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan,
Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and West Virginia.
Id.
17. H.R. Res. 548, 106th Cong. (2000).
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but also to create a certain reality. Indeed, one cannot help but
suspect that the act of instituting the national motto, or of requiring
its posting in schools, is not so much an act of describing a universal
truth as an attempt by a political or religious faction to install or shore
up that reality.
In light of this long, colorful, and ongoing history, can the
national motto be said to be a religious expression? Is it an
endorsement of religion or a proselytizing statement that violates the
18
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment? The national motto
and its use on currency have been challenged in lower federal courts
as unconstitutional establishments of religion. All such challenges
have been turned away, primarily on the ground that the motto lacks
19
any true religious or ritualistic force. Despite the obviously religious
origins of the phrase, courts typically suggest that “through historical
usage and ubiquity” the phrase has lost any and all force as an
20
endorsement of belief in God.
Yet, from the brief narrative just set forth, it seems that the
reality is much more complicated. From its beginning, the motto has
combined notions of patriotism and religiosity. It is certainly capable
of nonreligious use—witness Teddy Roosevelt’s citation of jokes
about the motto with a decidedly secular bent—and it would probably
be difficult to find anyone today for whom the inscription on currency
carries deep spiritual meaning. Nonetheless, the AFA’s campaign to
reinject God into the public school classroom demonstrates that the
18. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion . . . .”).
19. Gaylor v. United States, 74 F.3d 214, 216 (10th Cir. 1996); Aronow v. United States, 432
F.2d 242, 243–44 (9th Cir. 1970); Newdow v. Cong. of the U.S., 435 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1075–76
(E.D. Cal. 2006); O’Hair v. Blumenthal, 462 F. Supp. 19, 19–20 (W.D. Tex. 1978); cf. Lambeth v.
Bd. of Comm’rs, 407 F.3d 266, 270–72 (4th Cir. 2005) (rejecting a challenge to a particular
county’s decision to inscribe the national motto on the façade of a government building, largely
based on the view that the motto is secular). One challenge was rejected on procedural grounds.
Schmidt v. Cline, 127 F. Supp. 2d 1169, 1172–79 (D. Kan. 2000) (rejecting on standing and
mootness grounds the plaintiffs’ challenge to the county treasurer’s display of a particular poster
bearing the national motto but also noting that the plaintiffs’ challenge to the motto fails on the
merits based on the Tenth Circuit’s opinion in Gaylor). Other challenges, not constituting direct
Establishment Clause attacks on the motto itself, have also been raised and rejected. See
Keplinger v. United States, No. 4:CV-06-946, 2006 WL 1455747 passim (M.D. Pa. May 23, 2006)
(turning away a pro se challenge by a prisoner seeking to replace the word “God” with the word
“Yahweh” in the Pledge, the national motto, and the song “America the Beautiful”); Myers v.
Loudon County Sch. Bd., 251 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1273–75 (E.D. Va. 2003) (rejecting an as-applied
challenge to a public school’s display of a particular poster, which was donated by a religious
group, bearing the national motto).
20. Gaylor, 74 F.3d at 216.
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motto’s meaning is still flexible and open-ended: if the motto has lost
its religious force through time and repetition, the AFA, at least, must
believe that that force can be revived.
In the United States, the public culture is replete with brief
official acknowledgements of religion that initially appear innocuous
but pose thorny Establishment Clause problems. Examples range
from the national motto, to the words “under God” in the Pledge of
Allegiance, to the cities of Corpus Christi and St. Louis, to the phrase
“in the Year of our Lord,” or the abbreviation A.D. on public
21
documents. These brief religious references are often labeled
ceremonial deism, although that term in many ways obscures more
than it illuminates with respect to the broader set of phenomena
22
discussed here. Some brief religious references—such as city
names—are not accurately described as ceremonial, in that they do
not have a ritualistic or solemnizing quality. Nor are all instances of
so-called ceremonial deism in fact deistic—that is, they do not reflect
a point of view that embraces belief in God but is nonsectarian. The
phrase “in the year of our Lord” is a clear reference to Jesus Christ,
and the use of saints’ names for city names is associated primarily
with Roman Catholicism, which is unique in its recognition and

21. A.D. stands for anno domini, Latin for “in the year of the Lord.”
22. The phrase “ceremonial deism” was coined in 1962 by Eugene Rostow, former dean of
the Yale Law School, and has been used occasionally by the Supreme Court. Arthur E.
Sutherland, Book Review, 40 IND. L.J. 83, 86 (1964) (reviewing WILBER G. KATZ, RELIGION
AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS (1963)), cited in Epstein, supra note 3, at 2091. Epstein
misattributes the phrase to Walter Rostow. Epstein, supra note 3, at 2091. Epstein defines
ceremonial deism as
all practices involving: 1) actual, symbolic, or ritualistic; 2) prayer, invocation,
benediction, supplication, appeal, reverent reference to, or embrace of, a general or
particular deity; 3) created, delivered, sponsored, or encouraged by government
officials; 4) during governmental functions or ceremonies, in the form of patriotic
expressions, or associated with holiday observances; 5) which, in and of themselves,
are unlikely to indoctrinate or proselytize their audience; 6) which are not specifically
designed to accommodate the free religious exercise of a particular group of citizens;
and 7) which, as of this date, are deeply rooted in the nation’s history and traditions.
Id. at 2095. Epstein includes in this definition such arguably “private” speech as presidential
addresses invoking God. Id. at 2109. I agree with his ultimate conclusion that such instances of
quasi-private speech by public officials are not unconstitutional and that their regulation may
raise free speech or free exercise concerns. Id. at 2142–43. I therefore do not address them
further here.
In Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004), Justice O’Connor
created her own test for determining when a practice amounts to an instance of ceremonial
deism that does not violate the Establishment Clause, considering the factors of “[h]istory and
[u]biquity,” “[a]bsence of worship or prayer,” “[a]bsence of reference to [a] particular religion,”
and “[m]inimal religious content.” Id. at 37–44 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
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veneration of particular saints. This Article nonetheless retains the
term “ceremonial deism” as convenient shorthand, although the
Article’s scope is both broader and narrower than that
phenomenon—broader because it includes practices and brief
linguistic references that are neither ceremonial nor merely deistic,
but narrower because it focuses only on one justification for retaining
those practices, namely, the “secularization” thesis.
The focus of this Article is thus the wide range of practices,
phrases, and other brief or passing religious references espoused by
the government that have generally flown under the Establishment
Clause radar, particularly on the theory that they somehow have lost
their religious meaning. One might include in this list certain
practices, such as the public celebration of the Christmas holiday or
Sunday liquor laws. These examples may appear constitutionally
problematic to a greater or lesser degree, but they are typically
justified on the ground that, though religious in origin, they no longer
23
carry any religious impact. As discussed below in Part I, both courts
and commentators have dealt with such phrases, symbols, and
practices in largely unsatisfactory ways, but the primary argument for
their constitutionality is that they have lost their religious meaning
through history or rote repetition.
After describing how courts and commentators have addressed
these sorts of practices, Part I of this Article briefly places the
problem of ceremonial deism into the larger context of Establishment
Clause doctrine, much of which is in flux or disarray. Despite this
state of disorder, legal challenges to ceremonial deism are likely to
arise in the near future—and indeed, a second-round challenge to the
Pledge of Allegiance is currently percolating—requiring resolution by

23. Indeed, one commentator has defined ceremonial deism as “acts that have largely or
totally lost their religious significance because of their passive character or their long-standing
repetition in a civic context.” Andrew Rotstein, Note, Good Faith? Religious-Secular
Parallelism and the Establishment Clause, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1763, 1772 (1993). Less common,
but also relevant to the phenomenon of changed social meaning over time, are symbols or
practices that have secular origins but have taken on religious meaning. One might argue that
this is the case with Christmas trees or the entire symbology surrounding the Easter holiday.
See, e.g., PENNE L. RESTAD, CHRISTMAS IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 57 (1995) (“In pre-Christian
times, Romans used evergreens, symbols of fertility and regeneration, to trim their houses at the
Kalends [i.e., the first day] of January. Eventually, Christians appropriated the use of evergreens
for their Christmas celebration. To remove the taint of paganism, they associated it with new
beginnings and man’s second chance with God. The tree became for pious folk a representation
of Jesus as the Light of the World, Tree of Life, and second Adam born to right the sins of the
first.”).
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24

the Supreme Court. Regardless of the particular doctrinal
framework the Court adopts, resolution of future challenges will
depend on an understanding of the social meaning of the practice at
issue, and particularly on whether a phrase or practice may be
understood to convey a religious message or to have lost that
religious meaning.
Part II then outlines one particular branch of linguistic theory,
known as speech act theory, and sets forth several important elements
of that theory as they apply to the problem of ceremonial deism and
25
change in meaning over time. Speech act theory is a particularly
useful instrument for analyzing ceremonial deism because, as
explained in Part III, it is uniquely helpful for interpreting social
26
meaning. With its emphasis on illocutionary force over propositional
content, speech act theory emphasizes the effects of utterances over
their literal meaning, much like the Supreme Court’s current
Establishment Clause tests for determining the constitutionality of
symbolic religious references. But unlike most court opinions on
ceremonial deism, speech act theory has grappled carefully and
thoroughly with the difficult problem of how those effects may be
discerned, and with the effects on meaning of repetition and shifting
political and historical contexts. Speech act theory does not change

24. Newdow v. Cong. of the U.S., 383 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1241 (E.D. Cal. 2005) (holding that
the Ninth Circuit’s prior opinion, which held the recitation of the Pledge in schools
unconstitutional, is still binding because the Supreme Court reversed that decision on standing
grounds but did not vacate it). This newest Pledge challenge is currently pending on appeal in
the Ninth Circuit; oral argument was heard on December 4, 2007. Newdow v. Rio Linda Union
Sch. Dist., No. 05-17344 (9th Cir. argued Dec. 4, 2007). The same plaintiff, Michael Newdow,
has also brought suit in the Eastern District of California, challenging the constitutionality of
the national motto. Newdow, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 1075–76. Given that there was binding Ninth
Circuit precedent holding the motto constitutional, Aronow, 432 F.2d at 244, the claim was
dismissed, but an appeal of that case is also pending in the Ninth Circuit. Newdow v. Cong. of
the U.S., No. 06-16344 (9th Cir. argued Dec. 4, 2007). Oral argument was heard on the same
date as the argument in the Pledge case. Similarly, in December 2008, Newdow filed a complaint
challenging the use of the phrase “So help me God” in the presidential inauguration. Newdow’s
request for a preliminary injunction was denied on January 16, 2009, Newdow v. Roberts, No.
08-02248, slip op. at 2 (D.D.C. Jan. 16, 2009), and an appeal is pending, Newdow v. Roberts, No.
09-5126 (D.C. Cir. appeal docketed Apr. 9, 2009).
25. In drawing on theories of language, and in particular on a branch of the philosophy of
language known as speech act theory, I am continuing a project I began with an earlier article
on religious symbolism and the problem of context, which is to apply the insights of speech act
theory to problems of social meaning in constitutional law. B. Jessie Hill, Putting Religious
Symbolism in Context: A Linguistic Critique of the Endorsement Test, 104 MICH. L. REV. 491
passim (2005).
26. See id. at 512–14.
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the doctrinal analysis to be applied to religious references, but rather
provides a methodology for answering the questions that courts
already ask in such cases.
Thus, Part II begins by introducing the concept of illocutionary
effect, which is perhaps the central contribution of speech act theory.
It then describes some of the central characteristics of speech acts,
including their conventionality and the requirement of uptake. It also
explains the inherent tension that arises from the conventionality of
speech acts, by which meaning is both vulnerable and surprisingly
persistent.
Part III considers the doctrinal implications of this theory. First,
it explains why speech act theory is particularly relevant to the
problem of ceremonial deism, and second, it outlines a basic doctrinal
test, drawing on the principles of speech act theory, that courts should
use when deciding the permissibility of an instance of ceremonial
deism under the Establishment Clause. In particular, this Article
argues that courts should be skeptical of the “secularization” claim
and, to reflect this skepticism, should adopt a rebuttable presumption
of enduring religious meaning when confronted with constitutional
challenges to instances of ceremonial deism. After describing how this
rebuttable presumption might work in practice, Part III concludes
with some examples.
I. CEREMONIAL DEISM AND THE SECULARIZATION THESIS
The case law dealing with the constitutionality of ceremonial
deism has been less than satisfying from a doctrinal standpoint.
Although the Supreme Court has rarely addressed the issue head-on,
it has suggested in dicta that various forms of ceremonial deism are
constitutional. The Court’s reasoning has been notably sparse,
however, and the lower courts have largely followed suit in that
regard.
Scholarly commentators have discussed the problem at
somewhat greater length. Nonetheless, as discussed below, none of
the analyses get to the heart of the problem. In the next Part, I argue
that theories of language—and particularly theories about how
meaning can change—might provide some new insight into the
problem of ceremonial deism. But first, this Part expands on the case
law upholding or suggesting the constitutionality of several different
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instances of ceremonial deism and elucidates the secularization
27
theory behind those cases.
A. The Secularization Thesis
The origins of the secularization thesis—the notion that some
phrases or practices may be constitutional because they have lost
their religious meaning over time—are not entirely clear. The thesis
has made an appearance in a number of Supreme Court cases, but
most of those did not directly adjudicate challenges to brief official
religious references. In addition, the secularization thesis has usually
appeared in those cases without explanation and alongside other
more compelling rationales. Lower courts have nonetheless seized on
the thesis in disposing of challenges to ceremonial deism.
Somewhat inexplicably, courts analyzing ceremonial deism often
28
rely on the sui generis case Marsh v. Chambers, in which the Court
considered the constitutionality of Nebraska’s practice of starting
legislative sessions each day with a prayer led by a chaplain paid by
the state. In upholding the practice of legislative prayer in Marsh, the
Court did not apply any of the usual tests that it applies in other
Establishment Clause cases, but rather somewhat departed from its
precedent in reasoning that “history and tradition” support the
29
constitutionality of the practice. In an opinion that even Justice
Brennan’s dissent characterized as “narrow and, on the whole,
30
careful,” Chief Justice Burger pointed out various unique
characteristics of legislative prayer: that the practice dates back to
colonial times; that the First Congress engaged in the practice; that it
has continued without interruption ever since; and that most other
states have also engaged in the practice for an extended period of
31
time. This “unique history” led the Court to decide that the practice
was constitutional, while implying that the analysis was not likely to
have much application beyond the specific practice of legislative

27. For another description (and criticism) of the secularization thesis, see generally
Alexandra D. Furth, Comment, Secular Idolatry and Sacred Traditions: A Critique of the
Supreme Court’s Secularization Analysis, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 579 (1998). Furth defines
secularization as “the Supreme Court’s determination that practices and symbols which were
once religious have lost their religious significance, through either temporal or contextual
erosion.” Id. at 584.
28. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
29. Id. at 786.
30. Id. at 795 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 787–91 (majority opinion).

HILL IN FINAL

716

12/1/2009 6:11:56 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59:705

32

prayer. The Court also suggested that the practice was a mere
“acknowledgement” of the importance of religion in American
33
society and has become part of the “fabric of our society.”
As one commentator noted, despite its narrow drafting, Marsh
has been read in a number of ways: “as grandfathering long34
established customs”; as “a standard for what the Establishment
35
Clause must be thought to allow,” based on “historical practices and
36
understandings”; and as “an illustration of how repetition can
37
secularize what might otherwise be considered religious.” The Third
Circuit recently echoed the last of those interpretations when it
argued that Marsh stood for “the proposition that history can
38
transform the effect of a religious practice.”
39
A conceptual predecessor to Marsh is McGowan v. Maryland,
decided twenty-two years earlier. In McGowan, the Supreme Court
held that Sunday closing laws did not violate the Establishment
Clause because, although their original purpose was primarily to
facilitate Sunday Sabbath worship (which was often enforced by law),

32. Id. at 791. For an excellent critique of the Court’s reasoning in Marsh, and particularly
its claim that legislative prayer, at least on the congressional level, was uncontroversial
throughout its long history, see generally Christopher C. Lund, The Congressional Chaplaincies,
17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1171 (2009).
33. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792.
34. Mark Strasser, Establishing the Pledge: On Coercion, Endorsement, and the Marsh Wild
Card, 40 IND. L. REV. 529, 574 (2007).
35. Id. at 575.
36. Id. (quoting County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 669 (1989) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)).
37. Strasser, supra note 34, at 574–75.
38. Freethought Soc’y v. Chester County, 334 F.3d 247, 266 (3d Cir. 2003). Just one year
after Marsh, the Court cited Marsh but applied a slightly different approach to uphold the
constitutionality of a Christmas display in a public park that was maintained by the city of
Pawtucket, Rhode Island. In Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984), Chief Justice Burger
stated, “There is an unbroken history of official acknowledgment by all three branches of
government of the role of religion in American life from at least 1789.” Id. at 674. Then, after
cataloging the abundance of “official references to the value and invocation of Divine guidance
in deliberations and pronouncements of the Founding Fathers and contemporary leaders,” the
Chief Justice’s majority opinion concluded that the crèche display merely “depict[ed] the
historical origins of this traditional event long recognized as a National Holiday” and was
therefore “no more an advancement or endorsement of religion than the Congressional and
Executive recognition of the origins of the Holiday itself as ‘Christ’s Mass,’ or the exhibition of
literally hundreds of religious paintings in governmentally supported museums.” Id. at 675–78,
680, 683. In Lynch, the Court purported to apply the so-called Lemon test, in which a court
considers whether the purpose and effect of the government’s actions are religious or secular, as
well as whether there is excess administrative entanglement of religion and state. Id. at 680–85.
39. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
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their purpose had become simply to permit a universal day of rest.
Thus, the Court held that the laws, which appeared under the title
“Sabbath Breaking” and forbade “profan[ing] the Lord’s day,” did
not constitute an establishment of religion even though they were
41
“undeniably religious in origin.” The Court’s analysis relied in part
on the history of Sunday closing laws, including the numerous
changes in the language and structure of those laws that suggested
42
they had evolved.
This analysis was supplemented by a lengthier historical exegesis
by Justice Frankfurter, who acknowledged in a concurring opinion
that the laws have been “the vehicle of mixed and complicated
43
aspirations,” but agreed that they were constitutional despite their
44
facially religious language and original intent. The religious language
notwithstanding, Justice Frankfurter pointed out that “[c]ultural
history establishes not a few practices and prohibitions religious in
origin which are retained as secular institutions and ways long after
45
their religious sanctions and justifications are gone.” Although
McGowan’s language focused on the point in time at which the
purpose of a statute is relevant—holding that the Court would
consider the current purpose for keeping the statute rather than the
original purpose for adopting it—its analysis invokes, and is
sometimes used to support, the notion that religious meaning may be
46
lost over time.
On the whole, though, the Supreme Court has shown no great
appetite for addressing the constitutionality of ceremonial deism. In
47
Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, it famously dodged a
squarely presented question regarding the constitutionality of the
words “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance by turning the case

40. Id.
41. Id. at 445–46. McGowan also stands for the proposition that the Establishment Clause
is not implicated by the mere fact that a rule of law “happens to coincide or harmonize with the
tenets of some or all religions.” Id. at 442.
42. Id. at 431–40, 448–49.
43. Id. at 460 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
44. Id. at 459–95.
45. Id. at 503–04.
46. E.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 742 n.5 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting); Elk
Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 41 (2004) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment).
47. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004).
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away on standing grounds. Nonetheless, three Justices in concurring
49
opinions expressed their view that the Pledge was constitutional.
50
These opinions considered such factors as the lack of coercion, the
51
long history of official acknowledgements of religion, and the brief,
52
nondenominational nature of the reference to God.
A recurring theme in the Newdow concurrences, however, was
that the Pledge was a patriotic rather than religious exercise. For
example, Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded, after cataloging the
multiple references to God in various historic national documents,
not only that “our national culture allows public recognition of our
Nation’s religious history and character” but also that the Pledge “is a
53
patriotic exercise, not a religious one.” Because “[t]he phrase ‘under
God’ is in no sense a prayer, nor an endorsement of any religion, but
a simple recognition of the fact . . . that our Nation was founded on a
fundamental belief in God,” he continued, “participants promise
fidelity to our flag and our Nation, not to any particular God, faith, or
54
church.” Similarly, Justice O’Connor characterized the words
“under God” as “merely descriptive” and patriotic rather than
55
devotional. Indeed, citing McGowan, Justice O’Connor asserted that
“[w]hatever the sectarian ends its authors may have had in mind, our
continued repetition of the reference . . . in an exclusively patriotic
context has shaped the cultural significance of that phrase to conform
to that context. Any religious freight the words may have been meant
56
to carry originally has long since been lost.”
The remaining Supreme Court discussions of the
constitutionality of brief official religious references have appeared in
passing dicta. For instance, Justices have referred to the national
motto, presidential Thanksgiving proclamations, the Pledge, and
48. Id. at 4; cf. Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, the Pledge of Allegiance, and
Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118 HARV. L. REV. 155, 224
(2004) (“In Newdow, it may have been politically impossible to affirm [the Ninth Circuit’s
holding that the pledge was unconstitutional] and legally impossible to reverse.”).
49. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 18 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 33
(O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 54 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
50. Id. at 43–44 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 46–49 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
51. Id. at 30 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
52. Id. at 42–44 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
53. Id. at 30–31 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
54. Id. at 31 (internal quotation marks omitted)
55. Id. at 40–41 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
56. Id. at 41.
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invocations like “so help me God” in the presidential oath and “God
save the United States and this Honorable Court,” among others, as
apparently
constitutional
examples
of
official
religious
acknowledgements, either to support their view that other, usually
57
more novel instances of official religious speech are constitutional,
or to contrast these examples with other instances of official religious
58
speech that they view as unconstitutional. In so doing, the Justices
59
have invoked the history and ubiquity of these references, or have
opined that the references have lost their religious meaning over time
60
through rote repetition. For example, in County of Allegheny v.
ACLU, which involved a challenge to public displays of a crèche and
a menorah, Justice O’Connor suggested that the Thanksgiving
holiday, “despite its religious origins, is now generally understood as a
celebration of patriotic values rather than particular religious
61
beliefs.” And in the same case, a majority of the Justices assumed,
largely without explanation, that a Christmas tree is at least
62
sometimes a secular symbol. Finally, concurring in School District of

57. McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 887–93 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Newdow, 542 U.S. at 29–30 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 35–37, 36 n.*
(O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 624–
25 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 670–74
(Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472
U.S. 38, 88 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 676–77 (1984);
id. at 692–93 (O’Connor, J., concurring); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312–13 (1952).
58. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 716 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Allegheny, 492
U.S. at 602–03; Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 303–04 (1963) (Brennan, J.,
concurring); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 435 n.21 (1962); Wallace, 472 U.S. at 78 n.5
(O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Brennan claimed, beginning in Marsh, to be
uncertain about the constitutionality of ceremonial deism but insisted in Marsh that legislative
prayer was unconstitutional. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 813, 818 (1983) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); see also Lynch, 465 U.S. at 716 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (comparing the crèche to
more acceptable references to God in the national motto and the Pledge of Allegiance).
59. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 624–25 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
60. Id. at 631; Lynch, 465 U.S. at 713–17 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Marsh, 463 U.S. at 818
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Schempp, 374 U.S. at 303–04 (Brennan, J., concurring).
61. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 631. That the origins of the holiday are religious may be shown
by the fact that both Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson resisted issuing Thanksgiving
proclamations, and James Madison expressed regret that he had done so, all on constitutional
grounds. STOKES & PFEFFER, supra note 3, at 53–60, 504–06; Van Alstyne, supra note 12, at
775–76.
62. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 616; id. at 634 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment); id. at 641 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (joined by
Justices Marshall and Stevens) (allowing that “the tree alone may be deemed predominantly
secular,” even if it is not secular when placed next to a menorah).
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Abington Township v. Schempp, Justice Brennan cited McGowan v.
Maryland to suggest that some apparently innocuous religious
references might be justified as “activities which, though religious in
64
origin, have ceased to have religious meaning.” According to Justice
Brennan, they simply constitute recognition of “the historical fact that
65
our Nation was believed to have been founded ‘under God.’”
Lower courts have had more occasions to address the
constitutionality of various forms of ceremonial deism head-on.
Again, however, very little sustained reasoning has supported these
holdings. Some courts apply one of the standard doctrinal tests to
determine the constitutionality of a challenged practice, whereas
66
others, like the Supreme Court, do not apply any particular test.
Moreover, despite its narrow drafting, Marsh is often invoked to
support the notion that a long history may remove any otherwise
67
constitutionally problematic association with religion.
Challenges to the national motto have failed largely on the
ground that the motto has secular purposes and effects, in that it is
considered to be a patriotic or solemnizing phrase rather than a
religious one. This reasoning is often accompanied by the suggestion
that the phrase’s religious origins have been lost through “historical
68
usage and ubiquity.” Turning away one such challenge, the Ninth

63. Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
64. Id. at 303–04 (Brennan, J., concurring).
65. Id. at 304.
66. The test derived from Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), or a variant thereof, is
usually applied by courts in such cases. According to that test, “the statute must have a secular
legislative purpose; . . . its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor
inhibits religion . . . [and] the statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement
with religion.” Id. at 612–13 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
67. Myers v. Loudoun County Sch. Bd., 418 F.3d 395, 403–04 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing Marsh
in rejecting a challenge to the recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance in the public schools); Doe
v. La. Supreme Court, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18803, at *18–19 (E.D. La. Dec. 7, 1992) (citing
Marsh in rejecting a challenge to the words “in the year of our Lord” on Louisiana law licenses
and notarial commissions); cf. Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970) (noting, in a
constitutional challenge to the property tax exemption for churches, that “no one acquires a
vested or protected right in violation of the Constitution by long use,” but that an “unbroken
practice . . . is not something to be lightly cast aside”); Jeremy G. Mallory, Comment, An Officer
of the House Which Chooses Him, and Nothing More: How Should Marsh v. Chambers Apply to
Rotating Chaplains, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 1421, 1431 (2006) (noting that many of the cases citing or
discussing Marsh do not involve legislative chaplains).
68. Gaylor v. United States, 74 F.3d 214, 216 (10th Cir. 1996); O’Hair v. Blumenthal, 462 F.
Supp. 19, 20 (W.D. Tex. 1978); see also Justin Brookman, Note, The Constitutionality of the
Good Friday Holiday, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 193, 217–24 (1998) (discussing the phenomenon of
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Circuit Court of Appeals pointed out that “[i]t is not easy to discern
any religious significance attendant the payment of a bill with coin or
currency on which has been imprinted ‘In God We Trust’ or the study
of a government publication or document bearing that slogan. In fact,
such secular uses of the motto was [sic] viewed as sacrilegious and
69
irreverent by President Theodore Roosevelt.” The Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals, addressing a challenge to a Christmastime nativity
scene that included a large lighted Latin cross in ACLU of Illinois v.
70
City of St. Charles, described an extensive catalog of symbols and
terms that have “lost [their] religious connotations for most
people”—including Christmas trees and wreaths, the five-pointed star
of Bethlehem, and the city names of Santa Cruz and even St. Charles
71
itself. And in what might be considered the high-water mark of
secularization claims, the Ninth Circuit declared that Hawaii’s Good
Friday holiday passed constitutional muster, in part because it had
partly lost its religious effect during the fifty years that it had been
72
recognized.
Some opinions evidence a more nuanced approach to the
problem of change in meaning over time, suggesting that the passage
of time is simply one factor that a court must take into account when
determining whether a government action unconstitutionally
73
advances religion. In Freethought Society v. Chester County, the
court considered and ultimately turned away an Establishment Clause
challenge to a Ten Commandments display that had been placed on
74
the exterior of a county courthouse eighty-two years earlier. The
display, which had never been removed or maintained since its
75
erection, was situated beside an entrance that had become defunct.
While rejecting the notion that the display’s age alone could
immunize it from constitutional infirmity, the court insisted that
historical context was one consideration in determining whether the
secularization in the context of the Good Friday holiday, and attempting to set out factors for
determining whether secularization has occurred).
69. Aronow v. United States, 432 F.2d 242, 243 (9th Cir. 1970).
70. ACLU of Ill. v. City of St. Charles, 794 F.2d 265 (7th Cir. 1986).
71. Id. at 271–72.
72. Cammack v. Waihee, 932 F.2d 765, 782 n.19 (9th Cir. 1991). The court did allow that
the holiday had not become “‘secularized’ in the same manner as Thanksgiving and Christmas,”
by which the court apparently meant that the holiday had not been secularized to the same
extent. Id.
73. Freethought Soc’y v. Chester County, 334 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 2003).
74. Id. at 249–51.
75. Id. at 253–54.
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display had an impermissible purpose or effect under the
76
“endorsement test.” For the Freethought court, the relevance of the
passage of time was not that it destroyed the religious significance
originally carried by the Ten Commandments, but rather that the
maintenance of the historic Ten Commandments plaque did not send
77
the same message as a recently erected Ten Commandments plaque.
The court drew an analogy to both the national motto and the
expression “God save the United States and this Honorable Court,”
which—though they contain religious language—have been
“tempered by the secular meaning that has emerged over the passage
of time” and by their use for secular purposes, such that “the
reasonable person would not perceive in these phrases a government
78
endorsement of religion.” In other words, while acknowledging the
religious content of the plaque itself, the court found that the passage
79
of time dulled any endorsement effect.
Thus, despite its questionable pedigree and analytical backing,
courts often rely reflexively on the secularization thesis in dealing
with challenges to official religious references. When upholding such
a reference against constitutional challenge, a court’s reliance on the

76. Id. at 260 & n.10 (internal quotation marks omitted). Under the endorsement test,
courts consider “whether ‘a reasonable observer would view [the government action] . . . as a
disapproval of his or her particular religious choices.’” Id. at 257 (quoting County of Allegheny
v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 631 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment)). Although the endorsement test has been the dominant mode of evaluating
Establishment Clause challenges to symbolic and other primarily communicative government
actions, the Court has strayed from this test recently, Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686
(2005) (plurality opinion) (declining to apply the Lemon/endorsement test in favor of a
consideration of “the nature of the monument and . . . our Nation’s history”), and well may
abandon it altogether soon, see infra Part II.C.
77. Freethought Soc’y, 334 F.3d at 265.
78. Id. at 264; see also Eliott M. Berman, Note, Endorsing the Supreme Court’s Decision to
Endorse Endorsement, 24 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 17–18 (1990) (“[W]hen a reasonable
observer judges a government action, the tradition or novelty of the act is central to his or her
analysis. . . . To be sure, history lacks the power to turn a blatant message of endorsement into
thin air. . . . However, when the Court enters a difficult area and considers statutes that are on
the borderline of constitutionality, it is quite understandable why, under the endorsement test,
the history of the statute and of the public’s perception of government regulation in the area at
issue become significant elements of the Court’s establishment clause analysis.”); Brookman,
supra note 68, at 216–24 (arguing that the concept that religious symbols, holidays, and phrases
have been secularized over time “might be better understood as an argument that
the . . . endorsing value has been lost over time”). I have made a similar suggestion elsewhere.
Hill, supra note 25, at 524–26 (discussing “historical context” as one aspect of the context courts
take into account when determining whether a religious display violates the Establishment
Clause).
79. Freethought Soc’y, 334 F.3d at 262–70.
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secularization thesis often accompanies an assertion that the
challenged phrase does no more than acknowledge or describe the
80
role of religion in the nation’s history. Courts make such arguments
whether or not they are applying one of the standard Establishment
81
Clause tests. Given the frequency with which the concept of change
in meaning over time is invoked, it is surprising that so little
82
theoretical content is supplied to support the claim.
B. Criticisms of the Secularization Thesis
By and large, commentators have been critical of the notion that
phrases or practices that are originally or facially religious can simply
lose their religious meaning over time. Speaking specifically of Justice
O’Connor’s espousal of this notion in the context of religious
symbols, Professor Alan Brownstein has pointed out that the theory
has been largely unexplained, and like others, he has questioned the
accuracy of the claim. “Religious icons have remained powerful
symbols for centuries despite their familiarity,” he argues; moreover,
other types of symbols are not generally alleged to lose their meaning
83
over time. Judge Manion of the Seventh Circuit has similarly
criticized the concept of ceremonial deism. Like Professor
Brownstein, he questions why “only religious phrases” may “los[e]
their significance through rote repetition”: “Why only ‘under God’?
Why not ‘indivisible’, ‘liberty and justice for all’? Do not these
equally repeated phrases also lose their meaning under the logic of
84
‘ceremonial deism’?” Similarly, Professor Douglas Laycock and

80. The secularization thesis also implies that certain phrases or practices may have been
Establishment Clause violations at the time their usage commenced but, left unchallenged,
become constitutional over time.
81. Compare, e.g., Cammack v. Waihee, 932 F.2d 765, 778–80 (9th Cir. 1991) (deploying the
secularization thesis while applying the Lemon test), with Aronow v. United States, 432 F.2d
242, 243 (9th Cir. 1970) (claiming, in rejecting a challenge to the national motto, that the motto
is secular or patriotic rather than religious, without applying any particular test).
82. One commentator traces the secularization phenomenon to the concept of “civil
religion,” first described by Robert Bellah. Furth, supra note 27, at 596–600.
83. Alan Brownstein, A Decent Respect for Religious Liberty and Religious Equality:
Justice O’Connor’s Interpretation of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 32
MCGEORGE L. REV. 837, 853 (2001).
84. Sherman v. Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. 21, 980 F.2d 437, 448 (7th Cir. 1992) (Manion, J.,
concurring); cf. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 696 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(“[R]epetition does not deprive religious words or symbols of their traditional meaning. Words
like ‘God’ are not vulgarities for which the shock value diminishes with each successive
utterance.”). It is possible, of course, that “indivisible” and “liberty and justice for all” have, in
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others have forcefully argued that the words “under God” in the
Pledge of Allegiance have “obvious religious meaning,” as evidenced
by the fact that believers and nonbelievers alike find religious content
85
in the phrase.
In addition to questioning the factual accuracy of the claim that
religious meaning disappears over time, commentators have
emphasized the conceptual and theoretical difficulties that arise from
this approach. One prevalent argument is that it is denigrating to
religion and insulting to religious believers and nonbelievers alike to
say that the Christmas holiday, the national motto, and the like have
no religious content. Justice Brennan, for example, has forcefully
asserted that the suggestion that a crèche is
merely “traditional” and therefore no different from Santa’s house
or reindeer is not only offensive to those for whom the crèche has
profound significance, but insulting to those who insist for religious
or personal reasons that the story of Christ is in no sense a part of
86
“history” nor an unavoidable element of our national “heritage.”

fact, lost their meaning and force through this same logic, but if so, that fact would have little
relevance to the Establishment Clause analysis.
85. Laycock, supra note 48, at 224–27; see also Thomas C. Berg, The Pledge of Allegiance
and the Limited State, 8 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 41, 48 (2003) (“[I]t is simply untrue for many
people that ‘under God’ has lost its religious meaning. If the phrase had lost its meaning, it is
unlikely that so many people would be so angry about taking it out of the Pledge.”); Daniel O.
Conkle, Religious Expression and Symbolism in the American Constitutional Tradition:
Governmental Neutrality, but Not Indifference, 13 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 417, 433 (2006)
(“By all indications, the governmental expression in question does promote and endorse
religion, and it does so deliberately.”); Epstein, supra note 3, at 2165–66 (“[U]nder any honest
appraisal of modern American society, the practices constituting ceremonial deism have not lost
their religious significance. For instance, it would probably come as a great surprise to most
Christians that religion is no longer a significant component of the Christmas holiday. . . . And
although oaths, the judicial invocation, ‘under God’ in the Pledge of Allegiance, and the
national motto seem fairly innocuous at first blush, they pack a powerful religious punch to both
the most and the least devout members of the American population.”); Steven H. Shiffrin, The
Pluralistic Foundations of the Religion Clauses, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 9, 69 (2004) (“Citizens may
have forgotten that the City of Los Angeles has a religious meaning, but any English speaker
knows that ‘under God’ and ‘In God We Trust’ carry theological meaning.”).
86. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 712 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Laycock,
supra note 48, at 224–27, 233 (noting that the secularization of “under God” in the Pledge of
Allegiance is unacceptable to believers and nonbelievers alike); Robert A. Schapiro, The
Consequences of Human Rights Foundationalism, 54 EMORY L.J. 171, 179 (2005) (noting that
including “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance requires one to “affirm a deity in which one
does not actually believe” and that to treat the reference to God as meaningless “would be
insulting to those who take references to God quite seriously”); Shiffrin, supra note 85, at 68–69
(describing the argument as “ironic”); Steven D. Smith, How Is America “Divided by God”?, 27
MISS. C. L. REV. 141, 155 (2007) (arguing that “[s]uch explanations . . . demean the expressions
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Another prominent critique challenges the Court’s approach of
carving out a sort of de minimis exception to Establishment Clause
87
jurisprudence for ceremonial deism. Professor Laycock, for example,
has critiqued that exception on the grounds that it is standardless:
although it appears to exempt a small class of practices from
traditional Establishment Clause standards, the Court has given no
guidance as to what, if any, other practices or symbols may join the
“short list” of acceptable Establishment Clause violations; at least as
currently formulated, the de minimis exception for ceremonial deism
88
is a “standardless rule” that is “subject to manipulation.” Similarly,
Professor William Van Alstyne has noted that the logic and
standardless nature of the de minimis exception lead courts to apply a
89
new Establishment Clause test: an “any more than” test. According
to this “test,” courts simply consider whether a challenged practice
advances religion any more than practices that the government has
90
constitutionally engaged in previously. Of course, the answer to that
91
question is largely “in the eye of the beholder.” Such amorphous and
and insult the intelligence”); Furth, supra note 27, at 600–04 (describing how secularization of
religious symbols and language denigrates religion, offends both believers and nonbelievers, and
creates schisms within society); cf. Cammack, 932 F.2d at 790 (Nelson, J., dissenting) (stating
that it is “distasteful to practicing Christians” to compare the serious occasion of Good Friday
with the “mirth and levity” of Christmas and Thanksgiving).
87. E.g., Epstein, supra note 3, at 2166–69; Kenneth L. Karst, The First Amendment, the
Politics of Religion and the Symbols of Government, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 503, 521
(1992); Laycock, supra note 48, at 227–29, 231.
88. Laycock, supra note 48, at 232, 239–40. But see Conkle, supra note 85, at 435 (arguing
that “there is an implicit exception to the Supreme Court’s customary Establishment Clause
doctrine” but that it is “limited to a select group of governmental practices that are historical,
symbolic, and nonsectarian in nature; and that the exception is the product of a distinctive blend
of constitutional values”).
89. Van Alstyne, supra note 12, at 782–83; see also Epstein, supra note 3, at 2167–68
(discussing Van Alstyne’s “any more than” test and noting its problematic appearance in a case
upholding the constitutionality of the Good Friday holiday as similar to the Thanksgiving and
Christmas holidays).
90. See Van Alstyne, supra note 12, at 782–83 (describing the “‘any more than’ test”).
91. Epstein, supra note 3, at 2167, 2168 n.474. The Sixth Circuit’s opinion in ACLU of Ohio
v. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board, 243 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 2001), presents a salient
example of this “any more than” logic. In evaluating the constitutionality of the Ohio state
motto, “With God, All Things Are Possible,” id. at 291, which is a direct quote from the New
Testament, the court reviewed the wide variety of religious sentiments that had been expressed
in official fora and that apparently had been viewed as constitutionally acceptable, id. at 293–
300, before simply concluding that “[j]udged by historical standards, adoption of the motto no
more represents a step toward an establishment of religion than does our own practice of
opening each session of court with a crier’s recitation of the set piece that concludes—in words
also called out in the United States Supreme Court each day that Court sits—‘God save the
United States and this Honorable Court,’” id. at 300.
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manipulable arguments are not easy to refute, largely because of—
92
not despite—the lack of logical reasoning supporting them.
This Article acknowledges and accepts those criticisms, and at
the same time attempts to take seriously the notion that meaning can
change over time. In particular, it draws on the intuition that some
religious references—such as the city names of San Francisco, Corpus
Christi, and St. Louis—can fairly be said to have lost their religious
impact over time, whereas other phrases or symbols—such as “under
God” in the Pledge, “In God We Trust,” and Christmas trees—are
more controversial. The goal of this Article is thus to consider
whether and how a line may be drawn among various instances of
ceremonial deism on the ground that some facially religious terms or
practices have lost religious meaning.
In particular, this Article argues that both the way courts have
used the secularization claim and many of the ways in which
commentators have critiqued it rely on an incomplete understanding
of how language works. Linguistic theory can lead to a more nuanced
evaluation of the secularization claim and the circumstances in which
it may or may not apply. In particular, this more nuanced
understanding will provide some theory with which to both support
and critique a heretofore untheorized shibboleth underlying a largely
subjective determination. At a minimum, a theoretical framework for
understanding change in meaning over time can obviate or minimize
the criticism that courts have simply carved out an exception to
Establishment Clause jurisprudence for certain forms of ceremonial
deism, thus distorting the doctrine and opening the way for
standardless application. But perhaps more importantly, as explained
further in Part III, linguistic theory provides much reason to doubt
the validity of the secularization claim as it is made in many cases.

92. Finally, some critics have pointed out that there is an internal inconsistency in changedmeaning arguments, as “[s]uch an approach implies that phrases like ‘in God we trust’ or ‘under
God’ when initially used on American coinage or in the Pledge of Allegiance, violated the
establishment clause because they had not yet been rendered meaningless by repetitive use,”
though they may be constitutional now. Sherman v. Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. 21, 980 F.2d 437,
448 (7th Cir. 1992) (Manion, J., concurring); see also Myers v. Loudoun County Sch. Bd., 418
F.3d 395, 405 & n.11 (4th Cir. 2005) (noting that many Justices have followed changed-meaning
arguments in acknowledging ceremonial deism, but that ceremonial deism, as a theory, is
internally inconsistent).
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C. Ceremonial Deism in the Context of Establishment Clause
Doctrine
The Supreme Court has embraced numerous tests in the
Establishment Clause area, and it is often a guessing game to
determine which test will apply to a particular controversy. In the
Newdow case, for example, the two principal merits briefs combined
used no fewer than four different Establishment Clause tests in
arguing for the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of the words
93
“under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance. Given this state of
disarray, it is difficult to reason about the constitutionality of
ceremonial deism within any fixed line of doctrine. This Section
therefore attempts to place ceremonial deism into a clearer doctrinal
framework—both briefly describing the various analytic tests that
could be, and occasionally are, applied to ceremonial deism and
explaining the relevance of this Article’s project to the overall
doctrinal question of ceremonial deism’s constitutionality.
The various tests actually reflect two levels of disagreement
among the Justices of the Supreme Court. First, there is disagreement
over the method for determining whether a religious message is
conveyed at all by a particular instance of governmental speech.
Various tests have different ways of answering that question, which I
term the methodological question. Second, there is disagreement over
the question of how much, if any, official religious expression is
permissible under the Establishment Clause. I call this the substantive
question.
Courts have applied the Lemon/endorsement test, the coercion
test, and the so-called Marsh test—along with some variations of
those tests—to determine whether an instance of ceremonial deism is
constitutional. According to the Lemon/endorsement test, the court
must determine whether the government conduct is intended to
convey, or has the effect of conveying, a message of religious
endorsement—that is, whether it “sends a message to nonadherents
that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community,
and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders,

93. Petitioners’ Brief on the Merits at 24–45, Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542
U.S. 1 (2004) (No. 02-1624); Respondent’s Brief on the Merits at 8–38, Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (No.
02-1624). Petitioner Elk Grove’s brief applied the coercion test, the Marsh test, and the
Lemon/endorsement test, and also noted the Supreme Court’s dicta on the topic. Respondent
Newdow applied the neutrality test, the Lemon test, and the coercion test. The Court, however,
officially adopted none of these tests, as it decided the case on prudential standing grounds.
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94

favored members of the political community.” The court makes this
determination by asking whether a reasonable observer, familiar with
the history and context of the government practice at issue, would
95
perceive such endorsement.
The coercion test, by contrast, asks only whether the challenged
practice coerces participation in a religious exercise. The coercion test
differs from the endorsement test in terms of the substantive issue of
how much religious speech each is prepared to permit. The coercion
test is ultimately somewhat more permissive than the endorsement
test. At the same time, it is not clear that the two tests differ in their
methodology—that is, in how they determine the meaning of
96
government speech.
Finally, the poorly defined Marsh test appears to be
methodologically and perhaps substantively distinct from both the
Lemon/endorsement and coercion tests. The Marsh test looks to the
history and ubiquity of a practice, sometimes together with the
context of the particular challenged practice, to decide whether the
practice violates the Establishment Clause. At the heart of Marsh is
the view that a practice that has been engaged in without controversy,
sufficiently often and for a sufficiently long time, is ipso facto
inoffensive to the Establishment Clause. That view is often

94. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
95. E.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308–10 (2000). Maddeningly,
though, the Court declined to apply this test explicitly in Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677
(2005), which was a challenge to a Ten Commandments display. Indeed, Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s plurality opinion explicitly departed from the Lemon test and instead looked to
history and tradition, applying something more akin to the Marsh test. Id. at 686–92 (plurality
opinion). Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion, which provided the necessary fifth vote, eschewed
all tests and instead simply applied what he called “legal judgment.” Id. at 699–700 (Breyer, J.,
concurring in the judgment). Justice Breyer’s “legal judgment” appeared to be the functional
equivalent of the endorsement test, however. See generally Hill, supra note 25, at 496–502
(discussing Justice Breyer’s opinion in Van Orden in relation to other cases applying the
endorsement test and concluding that Justice Breyer’s approach in Van Orden was similar to the
Court’s approach in those other cases).
96. Given the retirement of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor—the creator and leading
proponent of the endorsement test—in 2006, and her replacement by Justice Samuel Alito, most
commentators agree that there are currently five votes on the Supreme Court to abandon the
endorsement test and replace it with a “coercion” or “proselytizing” test. E.g., Gary J. Simson,
Beyond Interstate Recognition in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 313,
379–80 (2006); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, The Future of Constitutional Law, 34 CAP. U. L.
REV. 647, 665–66 (2006) (noting that a majority of the Justices would now likely abandon the
endorsement test); Adam M. Samaha, Endorsement Retires: From Religious Symbols to AntiSorting Principles, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 135, 149 (describing the endorsement test as being “in a
precarious state” after the 2005 Decalogue cases).
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accompanied by the assertion that the religious reference does no
more than acknowledge or describe the beliefs of the Founders or the
97
historic role of religion in the history of the nation. Marsh’s
approach, especially to the extent that it implies that longstanding
and ubiquitous practices have become secularized, is present in the
98
way most courts deal with ceremonial deism. The concurring
opinions in Newdow, for example, repeatedly used the words
“describe,” “acknowledge,” and their synonyms in connection with
99
the Pledge’s religious phrase.
The Marsh test thus may differ from the Lemon/endorsement
and coercion tests primarily in its methodology—in how it determines
100
whether a particular government practice is religious or secular —or

97. See, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786–92 (1983).
98. See, e.g., Ashley M. Bell, Comment, “God Save This Honorable Court”: How Current
Establishment Clause Jurisprudence Can Be Reconciled with the Secularization of Historical
Religious Expressions, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1273, 1293 (2001) (“‘Secularization’ remains the
Court’s justification for upholding the legitimacy of historical religious expressions and other
overtly religious practices.” (footnote omitted)); Furth, supra note 27, at 585–93 (discussing the
secularization approach taken by courts in a variety of cases).
99. E.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 26 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he Pledge itself is a patriotic observance focused . . . on . . . the
description of the Nation. . . . [and] seems, as a historical matter, to sum up the attitude of the
Nation’s leaders.”); id. at 30 (“[O]ur national culture allows public recognition of our Nation’s
religious history and character.”); id. at 31 (“[T]he phrase ‘under God’ in the Pledge . . . is . . . a
simple recognition of the fact . . . ‘that our Nation was founded on a fundamental belief in
God.’” (quoting H.R. REP. 83-1693, at 2340 (1954))); id. at 33 (stating that “under God” is a
“descriptive phrase”); id. at 35 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating that the
Pledge serves “to commemorate the role of religion in our history”); id. at 40 (“Even if taken
literally, the phrase [‘under God’] is merely descriptive; it purports only to identify the United
States as a Nation subject to divine authority.”); see also Joan DelFattore, What Is Past Is
Prelude: Newdow and the Evolution of Thought on Religious Affirmations in Public Schools, 8
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 641, 649–50 (2006) (describing how Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
O’Connor characterized the phrase “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance as merely
descriptive); cf. Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Cross at College: Accommodation and
Acknowledgement of Religion at Public Universities, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 939, 980–93
(2008) (distinguishing three different types of acknowledgement—historical, reverential, and
cultural—and arguing that only reverential acknowledgement is constitutionally problematic).
100. After a challenged practice is determined to be secular, the Establishment Clause
inquiry is over. If a practice is determined under Marsh to be religious, the next question would
presumably be whether it is nonetheless permissible under one of the other Establishment
Clause tests. Because it is rare that the Marsh test leads a court to conclude that a challenged
practice is, in fact, religious, it is not clear how courts are to determine the answer to that next
question, however. Perhaps they must then apply the endorsement or coercion tests. That
appears to be the view of two concurring Justices in Newdow. Newdow, 542 U.S. at 31 n.4
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (combining the coercion test and Marsh factors);
id. at 34–45 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (combining the endorsement test and
Marsh factors).
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in its approach to the substantive question of how much religious
speech is acceptable, suggesting that invocations of God, as in the
Pledge and the motto, are constitutional because the Establishment
101
Clause permits such expressions of religious belief. Because the
Framers were themselves religious and often invoked God, they could
not have meant for those practices to be unconstitutional. After all,
those who wrote the First Amendment surely would not have
preached religious freedom with one breath while violating that
102
freedom in the next. In other words, rather than asserting that
“‘[u]nder God’ [i]s [n]ot an [a]ffirmation of [r]eligious [b]elief,” it
says, “‘[u]nder God’ [i]s an [a]ffirmation of [r]eligious [b]elief, and
103
[t]hat’s [o]kay.” It is often unclear whether the Marsh approach
differs from other tests methodologically or substantively or both,
because courts may collapse the two questions when applying Marsh
104
to ceremonial deism.
101. In this latter incarnation, Marsh’s approach is sometimes referred to as the
acknowledgement or accommodation argument, but it is different from the argument that mere
acknowledgement of the role of religion in the nation’s history is not unconstitutional because it
is not a religious message conveyed by the government. See Lupu & Tuttle, supra note 99, at
980–82 (distinguishing among types of acknowledgement).
102. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673–74 (1984) (noting that the First Congress
and the Congress of 1789 employed chaplains, but saw no constitutional violation in doing so);
ACLU of Ohio v. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd., 243 F.3d 289, 296 (6th Cir. 2001) (“If
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment had been understood by its authors to
prohibit the government from expressing sentiments of the sort contained in the Ohio motto
[‘With God All Things Are Possible’] . . . some of the behavior of the First Congress would have
been utterly inexplicable.”); Laura S. Underkuffler, Through a Glass Darkly: Van Orden,
McCreary, and the Dangers of Transparency in Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 5 FIRST
AMENDMENT L. REV. 59, 71–72 (2006) (describing “Scalia, Rehnquist, Thomas, and to some
extent Kennedy” as subscribers to the view that “[g]overnment can purposely engage in the
acknowledgement, preference, accommodation, even assistance of” monotheism); cf. Steven G.
Gey, Vestiges of the Establishment Clause, 5 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 1, 12–21 (2006)
(describing and critiquing this argument); Michael J. Perry, Freedom of Religion in the United
States: Fin de Siècle Sketches, 75 IND. L.J. 295, 309–11 (2000) (arguing that affirmation of certain
monotheistic religious tenets is consistent with the American version of nonestablishment of
religion). But see Kyle Duncan, Bringing Scalia’s Decalogue Dissent down from the Mountain,
2007 UTAH L. REV. 287, 288 (arguing that “[a] better reading [of Scalia’s views] is that the
government’s persistent acknowledgment of a generalized monotheism . . . provides merely a
baseline against which to interpret the Establishment Clause . . . [which] does not freeze a
preference for monotheism into the Establishment Clause itself, but rather defers to
representative bodies the development of our traditions to include specific monotheistic
religions, non-monotheistic religions, or atheism—or to end the tradition by opting for no
government acknowledgment of religion at all”).
103. DelFattore, supra note 99, at 648, 653.
104. See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 687–92 (2005) (plurality opinion) (applying
a “history and tradition” test similar to the Marsh test to determine that a Ten Commandments
display either did not convey a religious message or was religious but not unconstitutional);
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In essence, this Article assumes that “for now, the Court’s
general approach continues to preclude the government from
promoting religious expression” and therefore that any religious
speech by the government will at least raise substantial Establishment
105
Clause questions.
The focus of this Article is thus on the
methodological question, and specifically on how one is to determine
whether the religiosity of a particular practice, symbol, or phrase has
faded. This Article’s argument is thus relevant to either the
endorsement test or the coercion test, which vary only in the
substantive matter of the extent of government expression that is
permissible. It could also function as a replacement for the Marsh
test, which considers whether, in light of the ubiquity and long use of
a practice, an instance of religious speech has become a mere
recognition or description of the role of religion in the nation’s
history.
II. SPEECH ACT THEORY, ITERABILITY, AND CHANGE IN MEANING
OVER TIME
So far, this Article has established that courts have not analyzed
the constitutionality of brief official religious references, often
referred to as ceremonial deism, in a thorough or nuanced way.
Although courts and commentators sometimes assert that such
references are unproblematic because they have lost their religious
meaning over time or through repetition, these assertions are largely
unsupported and undertheorized. Moreover, the notion that religious
meaning can be lost over time has been criticized as factually
inaccurate, logically incoherent, and overly subjective. This obviously
problematic and much-maligned proposition—that meaning can
change over time in ways that are relevant to Establishment Clause
analysis—is the focus of this Article.
This Article now turns to the branch of the philosophy of
language known as speech act theory to consider the problem of
106
change in meaning over time from a new perspective. This new
Sherman v. Cmty. Consol. Sch. Dist. 21, 980 F.2d 437, 445–48 (7th Cir. 1992) (conflating the
methodological and substantive questions in determining whether the phrase “under God” in
the Pledge of Allegiance violated the Establishment Clause).
105. Daniel O. Conkle, The Establishment Clause and Religious Expression in Governmental
Settings: Four Variables in Search of a Standard, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 315, 316 (2007).
106. Although this Article occasionally refers to speech act theory as a branch of linguistic
theory, the main theorists of speech acts, such as J.L. Austin and John Searle, situate themselves
primarily in the field of analytic philosophy rather than linguistics. See, e.g., David Gorman, The
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perspective will hopefully present a new way of thinking about a very
old problem and particularly of attacking the thorny methodological
problem of determining the “effect” or “social meaning” of brief
official religious references, which courts—by simply declaring that
some words may lose their religious meaning over time—have not
done in a satisfactory way so far. This Part therefore briefly outlines
the premises of speech act theory, some of its central characteristics,
and its relevance to the problem of ceremonial deism.
First, Part II.A elucidates the concept of illocutionary force,
which is perhaps the central contribution of speech act theory. The
idea of illocutionary force shifts the emphasis in interpretation from
the propositional content of language to the actions it accomplishes—
in other words, its effects. It is thus particularly relevant to an
Establishment Clause analysis of religious speech, because
Establishment Clause doctrine is similarly concerned with the
endorsing, coercing, or proselytizing effects of such speech. Part II.B
then discusses the conventionality of speech acts, which is perhaps
their most important characteristic. Part II.B.1 explains what it means
to say that speech acts are conventional. Parts II.B.2 through II.B.4
delineate some important consequences that flow from this
conventionality. Finally, Part II.C discusses a final important
characteristic of successful speech acts—the necessity of uptake. This
Article does not pretend to give a comprehensive overview of speech
act theory as a whole, of course; such an undertaking would be well
beyond its scope. Rather, the Article’s goal is to give the reader a
working familiarity with the most basic premises of that theory and to
highlight those aspects of it that are most relevant to an
understanding of ceremonial deism—namely, speech act theory’s
emphasis on illocutionary force, its insight regarding the

Use and Abuse of Speech-Act Theory in Criticism, 20 POETICS TODAY 93, 108–09 (1999). The
theory has been influential in a number of fields, however—including linguistics—and a version
of it has found a particularly strong foothold in literary theory. Other legal scholars have also
discussed J.L. Austin and speech act theory, perhaps most notably in connection with free
speech doctrine. See generally CATHERINE MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS 21, 121 n.31 (1993)
(discussing speech act theory in connection with sexual speech); John Greenman, On
Communication, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1337, 1351–54 (2008) (discussing and critiquing the use of
speech act theory in free speech scholarship). In addition, Professor Heidi Hurd has explicated
the theory masterfully and at length in connection with statutory interpretation. Heidi M. Hurd,
Sovereignty in Silence, 99 YALE L.J. 945 passim (1990).
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conventionality of speech acts, and its elucidation of the requirement
107
of uptake.
A. Meaning and Illocutionary Force
Speech act theory is a branch of the philosophy of language that
considers how language actually works—and how and why it fails.
Rather than considering language as an abstract means of conveying
truth, speech act theory looks at language as it is used in everyday
life, perceiving language primarily as doing rather than as
describing—as bringing about states of affairs, with greater or lesser
108
degrees of success, rather than simply referring to them. The
founding father of speech act theory, J.L. Austin, was the first to
109
identify and describe linguistic utterances in these terms. Initially,
he considered speech acts, or “performatives,” as a class of utterances
that bring about an effect by the mere fact of their utterance, such as
“I do ( . . . take this woman to be my lawful wedded wife)”; “I name
this ship the Queen Elizabeth”; “I give and bequeath my watch to my
110
brother”; and “I bet you sixpence it will rain tomorrow.” As Austin
explains, “it seems clear that to utter the sentence (in, of course, the
appropriate circumstances) is not to describe my doing
111
[something] . . . or to state that I am doing it: it is to do it.” By
speaking, one effects the act of marrying, christening a ship,
bequeathing, and betting.
Law works by means of such performative utterances in many
cases, and it is easy to come up with other legal examples: imposing a
prison sentence, enjoining a party from taking an action, and forming

107. Indeed, not all scholars would agree with my understanding of speech act theory. As is
true of any substantial scholarly field, there is a large literature on the philosophy of language
and no small amount of disagreement within that literature.
108. Hill, supra note 25, at 511–12.
109. J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (J.O. Urmson ed., 1962). Austin’s
theory of speech acts owes much to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later work, in particular his
Philosophical Investigations. Austin’s work, however, is situated within a long history of
preoccupation with the relationship between language and action in analytic philosophy. This
preoccupation arguably can (like virtually every other intellectual endeavor) be traced back to
Artistotle. See Barry Smith, Towards a History of Speech Act Theory, in SPEECH ACTS,
MEANING AND INTENTIONS: CRITICAL APPROACHES TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN R.
SEARLE 29, 29–30 (Armin Burkhardt ed., 1990).
110. AUSTIN, supra note 109, at 5 (internal quotation marks omitted).
111. Id. at 6 (footnote omitted); see also LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF
JUDGES 154–55 (1993) (describing speech acts).
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a legally binding contract are also obvious performatives. Such
performatives were to be contrasted in Austin’s theory with
“constatives,” which merely report, state, or describe a state of
113
affairs.
Importantly, however, over the course of Austin’s study he came
to conclude that performatives were not in fact a unique class of
utterances within language; rather, he ultimately concluded, the class
114
of constative utterances is merely a subset of the performative.
After all, Austin explains, describing a state of affairs is doing
something with words, just as much as christening and marrying and
bequeathing and betting. “Surely to state is every bit as much to
perform [a speech] act as, say, to warn or to pronounce,” and indeed,
Austin admits that any criterion he can find to define a
performative—such as that it must be either successful or
unsuccessful, rather than true or false—applies no more or less to so115
called constatives than to performatives. Over the course of the
series of lectures that came to be published as How to Do Things with
Words, Austin’s analysis therefore shifted from distinguishing
performatives from constatives to establishing that performative
force, or what he referred to as illocutionary force, is a property of all
utterances, to be distinguished from what he called locutionary
116
force.

112. Evidence scholars may be familiar with the concept of performatives, which are related
to the “verbal acts doctrine,” involving statements that “affect[] the legal rights of the parties,”
United States v. Stover, 329 F.3d 859, 870 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory
committee’s note), and “have independent legal significance, such as contractual offers or inter
vivos gifts,” id. (citing 5 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S
FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 801.11[3] (2d ed. 1997)); see also Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Country Mut.
Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 1175, 1182 (7th Cir. 1994) (distinguishing between a statement that a party is
willing to settle a case and an offer to settle a case, characterizing the latter as “what
philosophers of language call a performative utterance, to which truth is irrelevant”).
113. AUSTIN, supra note 109, at 6 n.2.
114. Id. at 147–48 (“Stating, describing, &c., are just two names among a very great many
others for illocutionary acts; they have no unique position.”); see also, e.g., JONATHAN CULLER,
ON DECONSTRUCTION: THEORY AND CRITICISM AFTER STRUCTURALISM 112–13 (1982)
(discussing Austin’s analysis as leading to the conclusion that the constative is a special case of
the performative).
115. AUSTIN, supra note 109, at 133–39; see also Deirdre Wilson, Book Review, 88 MIND
461, 461 (1979) (“Austin claimed that there could be no purely syntactic basis for the
performative-constative distinction.”).
116. AUSTIN, supra note 109, at 149; see also David Gorman, supra note 106, at 97 (“Austin
expressly refutes the hypothesis of a constative/performative distinction . . . . The way in which
he starts over is to introduce quite a different distinction, between locutionary and illocutionary
acts.”); John R. Searle, Austin on Locutionary and Illocutionary Acts, 77 PHILOSOPHICAL REV.
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Indeed, the constative speech acts of stating, asserting, and
describing may be considered acts in several senses. They are acts in
the sense that they accomplish something specific and distinct that
can be performed through the use of words. They share all of the
qualities of speech acts, such as conventionality, iterability, and the
necessity of uptake, described further below. And they are often also
acts in the sense that they do more than passively observe or describe:
they may also help to construct the reality that they describe or
purport to describe. Descriptions and statements may have the effect
not only of telling someone a truth, or explaining a reality to someone
who is unfamiliar with that reality; they may also tend to reinforce
those truths or realities by presenting them as fact rather than as one
contested viewpoint among many. Indeed, this is precisely one
objection of feminist scholars such as Andrea Dworkin and Catherine
MacKinnon to pornography—it not only fantasizes but in some sense
117
perpetuates women’s subjugation. Moreover, when the state—the
voice of sovereign authority—engages in such speech acts, those
speech acts may have a particularly strong tendency to create the
118
reality they purport only to describe.
What one commonly thinks of as “meaning” therefore may be
thought to include two different concepts: locutionary force and
119
illocutionary force. The locutionary act may be roughly defined as
“uttering a certain sentence with a certain sense and reference”;
locutionary force, therefore, “is roughly equivalent to ‘meaning’ in
120
the traditional sense.” One might also describe the locutionary force
as the utterance itself, the literal or surface meaning of a particular
combination of words. Illocutionary force, on the other hand, is the
act (describing, sentencing, marrying, and so on) that is performed by

405, 405 (1968) (“The main theme of Austin’s How to Do Things with Words is the replacement
of the original distinction between performatives and constatives by a general theory of speech
acts.”); Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 869–70 (2002) (discussing Austin’s shift
from the constative-performative distinction to a new approach).
117. MACKINNON, supra note 106, at 11–31; see also Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of
Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 946–47 (1995) (describing how government can
construct social orthodoxy by adoption of specific stances on issues).
118. See infra Part IV.B.1.
119. AUSTIN, supra note 109, at 147. Austin also identified a third aspect of speech acts,
perlocutionary force, id. at 108, which has garnered less attention than the other two.
120. Id. at 108; see also Hurd, supra note 106, at 955 (“When one invokes a sentence as one’s
means of perfoming an illocutionary act, one performs what has come to be termed a
‘locutionary act.’ One performs such a locutionary act whenever one utters a meaningful
proposition about anything.” (footnote omitted)).
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and in speaking. Every meaningful locutionary act is also an
illocutionary act; locution and illocution are different aspects of the
121
same speech act.
“One sign of there being a difference between locutionary and
illocutionary acts is that it is possible to know what words were
uttered with which senses and references but still to remain in doubt
whether the illocutionary act was one of threat or advice or
122
warning.” Jonathan Culler gives the example of the statement,
“This chair is broken,” which may be an act of warning, informing,
123
conceding, complaining, and so on. Although the literal, locutionary
meaning of the sentence may be clear to the hearer, the illocutionary
force of it may or may not.
The so-called “Nuremberg Files” litigation presents an example
of the locution-illocution distinction in the legal context. On appeal to
the Ninth Circuit, the case largely centered on whether antiabortion
posters identifying certain abortion providers and giving their home
addresses, together with an antiabortion website, constituted a “true
124
threat” that was unprotected by the First Amendment. The website
listed names of abortion providers, which were struck through if the
provider had been killed or grayed out if the provider had been
125
wounded. Although the locutionary acts performed by the posters
and websites may have been entirely clear, the nature of the
illocutionary acts performed by the posters—whether they were acts
of threatening, protesting, or informing—was hotly disputed, resulting
in an en banc Ninth Circuit opinion that divided the judges six to
126
five.

121. AUSTIN, supra note 109, at 98. John Searle has pointed out that, although locutionary
and illocutionary are meaningfully different concepts, they are not mutually exclusive classes
because sometimes the locutionary act is the same as the illocutionary act—as in the sentence,
truthfully and correctly uttered, “I promise to do it.” The sense and reference of the sentence (I
promise to do it) is the same as the sentence’s force (I have accomplished the act of promising to
do it). Searle, supra note 116, at 407–08.
122. Gordon Bearn, Derrida Dry: Iterating Iterability Analytically, DIACRITICS, Fall 1995, at
3, 5 (citing AUSTIN, supra note 109, at 114 n.1).
123. CULLER, supra note 114, at 113.
124. Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290
F.3d 1058, 1062–63 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
125. Id. at 1063.
126. Id. (holding that the posters constituted a true threat).
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B. Conventionality
Speech act theory’s emphasis on illocutionary force has led
theorists to ask what, exactly, determines the illocutionary force of a
given utterance. The result has been the insight that speech acts are
127
inherently conventional. This Section first explains how speech acts
are conventional. It then extrapolates from that conventionality some
consequences that are relevant to an analysis of ceremonial deism.
1. The Conventionality of Speech Acts. To be effective as a
speech act, any meaningful statement must be uttered under the
appropriate conditions. To take a straightforward example, the
speech act of bequeathing possessions to an heir cannot be performed
successfully unless certain conventions are met. Those conventions
include the numerous formalities pertaining to wills under state law,
such as signature and witness requirements; the requirement that the
person doing the bequeathing have the legal authority to dispose of
that property; and the requirement that the individual not be
incompetent, under duress, performing in a play, or giving an
example of performative utterances in a law review article when the
words are uttered. But the words themselves—the locutionary act—
are also part of the conventionality of the speech act: although many
different combinations of words may be used to bequeath one’s
possessions, those words must still be recognizable to the relevant
128
readers as words of bequest. The requirement that speech acts, to
be successful, must be executed in the appropriate conventional
circumstances applies not only to obviously performative acts such as
sentencing, marrying, or christening but also to speech acts such as
describing: to take an example, one cannot describe something
129
successfully if one cannot observe it.
The conventionality of speech acts is one of its central features,
and much of speech act theory is preoccupied with the task of
isolating the conventions that are necessary for the success of

127. AUSTIN, supra note 109, at 120 (“Illocutionary acts are conventional acts . . . .”). I have
discussed the conventionality of speech acts elsewhere. Hill, supra note 25, at 512–15.
128. AUSTIN, supra note 109, at 14–15 (“There must exist an accepted conventional
procedure having a certain conventional effect, that procedure to include the uttering of certain
words by certain persons in certain circumstances, and further . . . . [t]he procedure must be
executed by all participants both correctly and . . . completely.”).
129. See id. at 138. Austin describes other ways in which constative speech acts may be
unsuccessful as well. Id. at 135–36.
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130

particular speech acts. Yet as described below in Part II.B.2, this
conventionality is also precisely what allows words to mean different
things when used in different contexts. The conventionality of
language is both what allows it to produce meaning and what creates
131
the potential for instability in that meaning.
2. Iterability, Speaker’s Intent, and the Vulnerability of Language.
The iterability of language is one important consequence that flows
from its inherent conventionality. If language is conventional, it must
function according to a set of learnable, and thus reproducible, rules.
The functionality of language depends, in other words, on its ability
to be repeated—on the ability of certain speech acts to be replicated
132
in a variety of contexts. This ability to be repeated, or “iterability,”
also means that any linguistic utterance is capable of being cut off
from both its original context and its speaker’s intent to be
reproduced in a context that may change or undermine its prior
meaning. Indeed, no speech act could function at all if this were not
the case—that is, if it were not both conventional and iterable. The
conventionality and iterability of speech acts ensure that the speech
act can be recognized, understood, and reproduced by different
speakers and listeners, but they also ensure that language can be used
133
in ways that may not have been originally intended. The inability of
the original speaker’s intent to control the meaning of the speech act
in the future makes it vulnerable to subversion. There are thus two
consequences of the quality of iterability that inheres in all speech
130. See, e.g., JUDITH BUTLER, EXCITABLE SPEECH: A POLITICS OF THE PERFORMATIVE 25
(1997) (discussing the importance of convention to meaning); JOHN R. SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS:
AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 54–55 (1969) (describing such a project).
131. I have discussed in depth the problems caused by the dependence of meaning on
context—another aspect of the conventionality that affects the success or failure of speech acts.
Hill, supra note 25. I therefore do not cover that ground again here.
132. The notion of iterability, and its role in producing or changing meaning, belongs
originally to the French philosopher Jacques Derrida. Jacques Derrida, Signature Event Context,
in LIMITED INC 1, 18–19 (Gerald Graff ed., Samuel Weber & Jeffrey Mehlman trans., 1988)
[hereinafter Derrida, Signature Event Context]. Derrida’s argument about iterability, which is
briefly described above, was the subject of a dispute between Derrida and John Searle, the
essence of which is encapsulated in Derrida’s essay, id., Searle’s essay, John R. Searle,
Reiterating the Differences: A Reply to Derrida, 1 GLYPH 198 (1977), and Derrida’s rather
lengthy and emphatic response to Searle’s reply, Jacques Derrida, Limited Inc a b c . . ., in
LIMITED INC, supra, at 29, 29–107 [hereinafter Derrida, Limited Inc].
133. See generally CULLER, supra note 114, at 118–20 (“[A]n utterance can be meaningful
only if it is iterable, only if it can be repeated in various serious and nonserious contexts, cited
and parodied. Imitation is not an accident that befalls an original [utterance] but its condition of
possibility.”).
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acts: first, it makes successful speech acts possible, and second, it
134
makes unsuccessful speech acts possible.
Jonathan Culler gives the example of the employer’s signature
135
on a paycheck. A signature signifies the intention of the signer to
endorse—that is, validate and stand behind—the document. To
function as such, however, the signature must be repeatable and
recognizable: it must be able to be copied, even by a machine. Thus,
the electronically produced signature on the thousands of paychecks
issued by large corporations can perform their function in the absence
of any present intention on the part of any particular signor or any
136
particular recipient.
Indeed, the conventionality and thus
reproducibility of the signature is precisely what opens it up to
forgery—to being used not only in the absence of, but directly
137
contrary to, the purported signatory’s intent.
Whatever the merits of this view for various other speech
situations, its relevance for the sort of government speech involved in
138
ceremonial deism seems inescapable. The fundamental quality of
iterability is that it allows utterances to be meaningful when the
139
speaker or the hearer, or both, are absent. Thus, the utterance must
134. Bearn, supra note 122, at 8. Bearn is summarizing Derrida here, and in doing so, Bearn
espouses Derrida’s strong view that every speech act is not only potentially but actually
“imperfect, incomplete, [and] unsuccessful.” Id. This is a version of the deconstructionist thesis
regarding the indeterminacy of meaning. Without going into the details of that view or Bearn’s
highly articulate defense of it, I will simply note that one need not accept the premise that all
speech is always indeterminate to accept the argument set forth in this Article, as this Article
does not rely on that stronger thesis.
135. CULLER, supra note 114, at 125–26.
136. See id. at 125–26 (“[I]terability, an essential feature of the structure of the signature,
introduces as part of its structure an independence from any signifying intention. If the
signature on a check corresponds to the model, the check can be cashed whatever my intentions
at the moment of signature. . . . We can, fortunately, cash checks signed by a machine and
receive a salary even though the signatory never saw the check nor entertained a specific
intention to pay us the sum in question.”). Derrida nonetheless accepts the possibility of a
“structural intentionality which is never anywhere present and which includes implications that
never” entered the mind of any one individual. Id. at 127.
137. Likewise, Judith Butler notes that the term “queer” has been appropriated by the gay
rights movement to the extent that it no longer has its original negative connotations. JUDITH
BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER: ON THE DISCURSIVE LIMITS OF “SEX” 223 (1993).
138. This view is also arguably relevant to the interpretation of statutes. See Hurd, supra
note 106, at 951, 990. Professor Hurd argues that statutes are not “communicative” speech acts,
in that they are not “communications by a sovereign speaker to an audience, the understanding
of which depends upon the audience’s success at deciphering authorial intentions.” Id. at 951.
139. Bearn, supra note 122, at 6 (noting that Derrida introduces the concept of iterability
“to name the power of written marks to function, that is, to be readable, in the absence of the
receiver and in the absence of the sender”).
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function “in the . . . absence of the receiver or of any empirically
determinable collectivity of receivers,” and at the same time, “it must
continue to ‘act’ and to be readable even when . . . the author of the
writing no longer answers for what he has written . . . because he is
dead or, more generally, because he has not employed his . . . present
intention or attention . . . [to] what seems to be written in his
140
name.” As Judith Butler puts it, “The Austinian subject speaks
conventionally, that is, it speaks in a voice that is never fully
singular. . . . Who speaks when convention speaks? In what time does
convention speak? In some sense, it is an inherited set of voices, an
141
echo of others who speak as the ‘I.’”
The conventional, plural, inherited nature of this speech thus
142
greatly minimizes the importance of the intent or purpose behind it.
Indeed, Justice Samuel Alito recently made a similar observation in
143
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, in which the Court unanimously
decided that the religious group Summum did not have a right to
erect its monument in a public park alongside other monuments,
including a Ten Commandments monument donated by the Fraternal
Order of Eagles, because the permanent monuments in the park
144
constituted government speech. While acknowledging that the
government can usually be said to endorse the message contained in
the monument, Justice Alito pointed out that monuments do not
145
always express the original intent of their donors. Referring to a
statue of Francisco “Pancho” Villa donated by the Government of
Mexico to the city of Tucson, Arizona, for example, Justice Alito
questioned whether it “commemorate[d] a ‘revolutionary leader who
146
advocated for agrarian reform and the poor’ or ‘a violent bandit.’”
By accepting a monument, he noted, “a government entity does not
necessarily endorse the specific meaning that any particular donor
147
sees in the monument.” Moreover, Justice Alito explained, “people

140. Id. at 6 (quoting Derrida, Signature Event Context, supra note 132, at 7–8).
141. BUTLER, supra note 130, at 25.
142. Cf. Hill, supra note 25, at 514–15 (noting the relative lack of importance ascribed to
subjective intent by speech act theory).
143. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009).
144. Id. at 1129.
145. Id. at 1135–36.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1136.

HILL IN FINAL

2010]

12/1/2009 6:11:56 PM

CEREMONIAL DEISM

741

reinterpret the meaning of these memorials as historical
148
interpretations and the society around them change[].”
Like the employer’s signature on a paycheck, many examples of
ceremonial deism—city names, the national motto, the language of
the Pledge, and even Christmas trees—function by means of this
iterability; they function in the absence of any particular speaker or
149
any particular intended hearer. The national motto on coins, for
example, would be identifiable in general as government speech, but
it is not identified with any individual speaker or any particular
government in American history. Readers cannot honestly attribute
those words to Abraham Lincoln, or Teddy Roosevelt, or the Sixtieth
U.S. Congress. It is an “inherited set of voices” that speaks, echoing
throughout history, which is strictly attributable only to a machine at
150
the U.S. Mint.
Indeed, the motto itself demonstrates the importance of
iterability as well as the role of iterability in making meaning
vulnerable. The motto is recognizable as such because of the
repetition of its exact phrasing and its placement on the coins. But at
the same time, its repeatability, and thus its recognizability, is exactly
what opens it up to new, and possibly ironic, use in other contexts—
such as the joke “In God we trust for the other eight cents.” The joke
draws its humor from the way it trivializes the religious component of
the motto, as well as the way in which it associates God and
Mammon—an association that is latent but unexplored in the motto’s
use on currency itself. It is legible, or comprehensible, only in terms
of “the past from which it breaks”—that is, in terms of its religious
151
origins.
Yet the possibility of resignification need not have application
only when a phrase or term is used facetiously; other contexts that
undermine or change the prior meaning of a term will function in the
152
same way. Thus, for example, the Court in Lynch v. Donnelly,
arguing that the City of Pawtucket’s crèche display simply “depict[ed]

148. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
149. Cf. Hurd, supra note 106, at 968–81 (noting that statutes—another form of government
speech—do not have intentional speakers or intended audiences in the usual, communicative
sense).
150. BUTLER, supra note 130, at 25.
151. See id. at 14. Butler is speaking about hate speech and its reappropriation by
subordinated groups, but there is no reason that this mechanism must be limited to hate speech.
152. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
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153

the historical origins” of the Christmas holiday, analogized to the
religious paintings, primarily Christian in their orientation, that hang
154
in the National Gallery. The museum context invoked by the Court
shows that the changed context can, in a sense, remove any religious
meaning from the work of art. In other words, even if the artwork
itself has deep religious meaning, its placement in the National
Gallery does not suggest the illocutionary act of government
endorsement of Christianity, but rather of depiction of religious
events, or simply of visually “quoting” the artist’s religiously
155
motivated expression.
3. The Persistence of Meaning. Despite this vulnerability,
illocutionary force at the same time possesses a surprising persistence.
Judith Butler has argued that both past and future uses are, in a
sense, contained within any single usage of a term, because
iterability—which permits a vast variety of actual and possible usages
of a given term, both “serious” and “nonserious”—is a necessary
156
condition of successful speech acts. Thus, “[t]he illocutionary speech
act” possesses a kind of “condensed historicity: it exceeds itself in past
and future directions, an effect of prior and future invocations that
157
constitute and escape the instance of utterance.”
Linguistic
vulnerability thus opens up the possibility of “resignification,” by
which language at least in part breaks with its prior contexts and prior
158
usages by being used in new ways and new contexts; but at the same
time, each time a term is used, it invokes its past usages and thus
“reconsolidates” them, reminding the reader or listener of its
historical meanings.
For example, one might consider the word “Amen.” Translated
and transliterated from Hebrew, the word “Amen” roughly means
“so be it,” and is often used in or after prayers to express agreement
or affirmation, with the implication that God has so willed. Because

153. Id. at 680.
154. Id. at 676–77.
155. Cf. id. at 692 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[A] typical museum setting, though not
neutralizing the religious content of a religious painting, negates any message of endorsement of
that content.”).
156. Again, one need not accept Butler’s general critique or theory of language to accept its
application to bureaucratic invocations of God and other instances of “speakerless” ceremonial
deism discussed here.
157. BUTLER, supra note 130, at 3.
158. Id. at 13–15.
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the word is iterable, however, it can be used in a variety of ways.
Although not necessarily inherently religious, the word is
recognizable as a religious affirmation when said in the context of a
religious service. At the same time, it can be used in nonreligious
contexts and lose its religious meaning—or even have the opposite
meaning, perhaps when used ironically. One can imagine a
conversation, for instance, in which a speaker, having proven the
nonexistence of God, says, “And that is why God does not exist,” to
which the sympathetic listener replies, “Amen.” It is because the
second speaker has used the term “Amen” in a recognizable way, as
an affirmation, following certain conversational conventions, that the
159
usage is recognizable as such. Yet the word “Amen” is not being
used in a religious way; in fact, it is used in precisely the opposite way.
At the same time, the ironic impact of this usage can only arise
because the speaker and listener are aware of the religious use to
which the term is commonly put: the religious usages of the term
inform the nonreligious usage and help produce its meaning.
To take an example that presents the opposite dynamic, one
might consider the case of State Board of Education v. Board of
160
Education of Netcong, in which the New Jersey Superior Court
upheld a constitutional challenge to one school district’s practice of
beginning each school day with a reading of a portion of the
Congressional Record containing one of the daily prayers delivered
161
by the congressional chaplain. This case, which arose several years
before the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Marsh v. Chambers,
illustrates how the repetition of identical language in a new context
may change its meaning. Indeed, one of the school board’s defenses
in the case was that the readings were secular and therefore not
162
subject to an Establishment Clause challenge. Yet in the school
setting, the court found that the readings were indistinguishable from
163
the sort of prayer that had recently been outlawed in Engel v. Vitale
164
and School District of Abington Township v. Schempp. Even if the
court had espoused Marsh’s view that legislative prayer was of such
long standing as to lose its religious force, it seems that reading the
159. For example, it would not be similarly comprehensible if the speaker instead had
replied, “I amen disagree with you.”
160. State Bd. of Educ. v. Bd. of Educ. of Netcong, 262 A.2d 21 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1970).
161. Id. at 23.
162. Id. at 27.
163. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
164. Netcong, 262 A.2d at 30–31.
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identical prayers in schools, given the captive audience and the recent
history of the Supreme Court’s decisions outlawing school prayer,
would have an entirely different meaning. The repetition of the
prayers in a new context thus revived any religious force that may
have been minimized or eliminated in the congressional setting.
On the one hand, then, each usage of a term (such as the word
“Amen” or the national motto) invokes the history of the terms and
their various contexts and usages—religious and nonreligious. On the
other hand, though, the past usages of a term cannot continue to
dictate its future meanings, and the possibility of resignification—
through presentation in a new context, or the willful act of the
speaker, for example—always exists. Meaning is at once both
vulnerable and surprisingly persistent.
4. How Speech Acts Succeed Despite Their Vulnerability. The
preceding explanation illustrates that there is a certain tension in the
citation or repetition of phrases or speech acts. Insofar as language
sometimes both names and enforces certain norms—for example, the
words “In God We Trust” purport to describe a fact about American
society—the repetition and readoption of those words in various
contexts reinforces the original strength of those norms. Yet at the
same time, language is vulnerable; it cannot be completely efficacious
in its enforcement of norms. Thus, “[s]uch norms are continually
165
haunted by their own inefficacy.” This inefficacy leads to “the
166
anxiously repeated effort to install and augment their jurisdiction.”
Indeed, because language is iterable and therefore partially open to
change, any phrase—no matter how solemn—is always capable of
167
being appropriated into a context that changes or subverts it.
Repetition of a phrase may accordingly be an effort to install or shore
up the reality of which it appears to be merely a descriptive

165. BUTLER, supra note 137, at 237.
166. Id. at 237. Butler’s fascinating explanation for this phenomenon is that, because the
sovereign power of the state is now “[d]iffused throughout disparate and competing domains of
the state apparatus,” rather than consolidated in a single sovereign as it once was, “the historical
loss of the sovereign organization of power appears to occasion the fantasy of its return . . . in
the figure of” the sovereign—and hence always efficacious—performative. Thus, language is
established “as a displaced site of politics . . . driven by a wish to return to a simpler and more
reassuring map of power, one in which the assumption of sovereignty remains secure.” BUTLER,
supra note 130, at 78.
167. One might think, for example, of Andres Serrano’s famous (and famously
controversial) photograph Piss Christ, which depicts a crucifix submerged in urine. No matter
how sacred the symbol or speech, it is always capable of appropriation.
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168

statement —hence the struggle to keep the motto on the coins and
require its posting in schools. Repetition may be a technique for
undermining a particular illocutionary force, but it may also be an
attempt to counteract the inherent vulnerability of language and
169
reinforce a particular illocutionary act.
Yet the illocutionary act succeeds only “to the extent that it
170
draws on and covers over” its origins. The motto “In God We
Trust,” for example, succeeds in describing or imposing a view about
American religious values to the extent that, in context, it calls upon
its historical usage—for example, as a unifying sentiment in the Civil
171
War era —while covering over both its original religiosity and the
172
spirit of exclusion that motivated the motto’s adoption in the 1950s.
In so doing, the motto gives the illusion of a universal belief that can
173
claim the support of virtually all citizens. It is only in this way that

168. It is interesting to note in this connection how many of the recent legal and political
controversies in the Establishment Clause domain center precisely around the sort of symbolic
struggle Butler describes, in the form of linguistic or nonlinguistic religious government
expression. Since 2005, for example, all of the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause opinions
have been about the constitutionality of some form of religious expression, and the Court’s most
recent decision, Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (2009), similarly dealt with
religious expression, but in a free speech context. One suspects that a sort of displacement is
taking place—a displacement of struggles over political power and the government fisc to
struggles over symbolic power.
169. Indeed, the Netcong case, discussed above, may also be read as an instance in which
repetition is an attempt to reinforce certain norms in the face of recent threats to them. In
Netcong, the New Jersey Superior Court enjoined a local school district’s practice of reading the
legislative prayer out of the Congressional Record to those students who wished to listen.
Netcong, 262 A.2d at 32. Although the case was decided before Marsh, it is interesting to note
that the court did not appear to believe the congressional practice of legislative prayer to be
unconstitutional but found that the repetition of those prayers in a different context was an
imposition of religion on the schoolchildren. Id. at 29–32. Like the AFA’s efforts to install the
national motto in schools, the school district’s practice seemed to be an attempt to shore up the
religious message of those legislative prayers by repeating them in a context that enhanced their
religious force. The context of that action was the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in the 1960s
striking down school prayers. Whereas the legislative prayers may go virtually unnoticed in the
halls of Congress, with legislators entering and leaving throughout, the prayers’ recitation in the
school context draws special attention to their content.
170. Or, in Judith Butler’s terms, the speech act succeeds “to the extent that it draws on and
covers over the constitutive conventions by which it is mobilized”—that is, the sociohistorical
context or contexts that give it its force. BUTLER, supra note 130, at 51 (emphasis omitted);
BUTLER, supra note 137, at 227.
171. See supra note 3.
172. See supra note 3.
173. The solemnizing use of the phrase also denies the motto’s historicity and the
multiplicity of potential and actual usages contained within that history—as in the “sacrilegious”
jokes.
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courts can claim that such invocations are purely patriotic rather than
religious sayings. They must deny the origins of the phrase and the
political dynamic that informed its adoption to install it as a generic
sentiment of national pride.
American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio v. Capitol Square Review
174
& Advisory Board neatly illustrates this dynamic of covering. This
Sixth Circuit case turned away a constitutional challenge to the Ohio
state motto, “With God All Things Are Possible,” which had been
adopted in 1959 and was proposed to be inscribed in large letters in
175
front of the statehouse. The district court denied the plaintiffs’ claim
that the motto itself was unconstitutional, but it did enjoin the state
from attributing it to the New Testament, from which the words were
176
in fact adopted. The phrase thus having been stripped of its origins,
the appeals court asserted that “[t]here is . . . nothing uniquely
177
Christian about the thought that all things are possible with God.”
It then proceeded to catalog, based on expert testimony, various
appearances of the sentiment throughout a panoply of religious and
philosophical traditions, including Greek philosophy, Judaism, Islam,
and Hinduism; ultimately, the court agreed with the defendants’
expert that Jesus’s original statement in the New Testament “was
simply using a proverbial phrase that was commonly known and
178
accepted as true.” Indeed, the court even quoted expert testimony
claiming that the phrase was functionally equivalent to Yogi Berra’s
179
saying, “[i]t’s never [sic] over until it’s over.”
Ironically, however, the history cited by the court both “draws on
180
and covers over” the social and historical context that is both
present and buried within the motto. Having papered over the

174. ACLU of Ohio v. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd., 243 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 2001)
(en banc).
175. Id. at 291–92.
176. Id. at 293.
177. Id. at 303.
178. Id. at 303–05 (emphasis omitted) (quoting an expert witness for the defendant).
179. Id. at 305 (internal quotation marks omitted). In fact, Berra said “It ain’t over ‘til it’s
over.” YOGI BERRA, THE YOGI BOOK: “I REALLY DIDN’T SAY EVERYTHING I SAID!” 121
(1998). Apparently, the Sixth Circuit preceded Chief Justice Roberts in correcting an icon’s
grammar when quoting from the archives of pop culture. See Adam Liptak, The Chief Justice,
Dylan and the Disappearing Double Negative, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2008 (Week in Review)
(noting that Chief Justice Roberts quoted Bob Dylan in Sprint Communications Co. v. APCC
Services, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2531 (2008), but corrected his grammar, “proving that [Roberts] is
neither an originalist nor a strict constructionist”).
180. BUTLER, supra note 130, at 51 (emphasis omitted).
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motto’s origin in the New Testament, the court attempted to
demonstrate the multiplicity of religious and philosophical traditions
that embrace the motto’s sentiment. Yet the force of the phrase—an
injurious force for some—draws precisely on the fact that it does not
say (as does Homer, quoted by the court), “[t]o the gods all things are
181
possible,” or, as does Yogi Berra, “[i]t’s never [sic] over until it’s
182
over.” Rather, it is a phrase with specifically Christian origins,
chosen from a sacred Christian text. It is nearly impossible to imagine
that the state would have accepted a suggestion to modify the motto
to read “to the gods all things are possible.” The motto’s unique
meaning is dependent upon its religious and Christian origins; yet the
court covers over those origins in suggesting that the phrase is
nothing other than an uncontroversial and universally shared
183
sentiment. The motto’s effectiveness as a religious statement arises
from its ability to draw upon and cover over its original context.
As this account makes clear, speech acts often appear to deny or
conceal their original context—particularly when they are repeated
throughout history and in varying new contexts—but at the same
time, the original context continues to give the speech act its force. In
addition, the original context that must be concealed is often a
184
context of political or social subordination or strife. Such contexts
are ignored so that the speech act can appear to possess a singular,
unifying, and uncontroversial meaning. But in reality, the past
meaning persists, if only as the original context that gives the speech
act its force and authority. Past social context therefore may play a

181. ACLU of Ohio, 243 F.3d at 303.
182. Id. at 305.
183. Cf. Robert Post, Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, in LAW AND THE ORDER OF
CULTURE 13, 13 (Robert Post ed., 1991) (describing the testimony of the legislative chaplain in
Marsh, who occasionally prayed in the name of Jesus but claimed to strive to represent “just
civil religion in America” and “the Judeo-Christian tradition . . . that [is] common to the vast,
overwhelming majority of most all Americans” (quoting testimony of Robert E. Palmer, Marsh
v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), joint appendix)); see also Brief of Baptist Joint Committee
and The Interfaith Alliance Foundation as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Van Orden v.
Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (No. 03-1500), 2004 WL 2899175, at *7–8 (noting that courts dealing
with challenges to Ten Commandments displays tend to “rip[] from context” and emphasize
“the Commandments with secular equivalents”); cf. Christopher Lund, Keeping the
Government’s Religion Pure: Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 104 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY
46, 51 (2009), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2009/28/LRColl2009n28
Lund.pdf (describing how the Solicitor General’s brief in Pleasant Grove subtly connected the
Summum religion to al-Qaeda to portray it as “false, dangerous, and un-American”).
184. Lund, supra note 183, at 51–52 (arguing that endorsement of one religion always entails
exclusion of another, though that exclusion is rarely acknowledged or made explicit).
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role in interpreting such speech acts. An understanding of any history
of subordination or strife will be relevant to discerning the present
force of a particular instance of ceremonial deism for Establishment
Clause purposes.
To summarize, there is support for the theory that repetition and
long use may mitigate the religious force of a facially religious
reference. At the same time, repetition invokes and often reinforces
the prior meanings and origins on which new meanings depend.
Meaning is thus capable of changing, but it more often displays a
surprising persistence. Moreover, the effectiveness of speech acts
often depends precisely on their ability to cover over their origins; as
such, it is particularly important to be attentive to the social context
that gave rise to a particular statement or phrase. As discussed further
in Part III, moreover, there is great reason to doubt, in many
instances at least, the claim that a religious phrase has lost its religious
significance over time.
C. Uptake
A final, critical aspect of illocutionary acts is that of uptake. For
an utterance to constitute an actual promise, endorsement, or any
185
other speech act, it must “secur[e] . . . uptake.” As John Searle
explains, the illocutionary act of ordering someone to do something
might be unsuccessful in certain circumstances:
For example, I might utter the sentence to someone who does not
hear me, and so I would not succeed in performing the illocutionary
act of ordering him, even though I did perform a locutionary act
since I uttered the sentence with its usual meaning (in Austin’s
terminology in such cases I fail to secure ‘illocutionary uptake’). Or,
to take a different example, I might not be in a position to issue
186
orders to him, if, say, he is a general and I am a private . . . .

In the context of an individual speech act by one speaker to
another, the concept of uptake seems relatively straightforward. In
the context of ceremonial deism, however, in which a constitutional
challenge is brought regarding instances of government speech on
coins or in classroom recitations, this concept becomes highly

185. AUSTIN, supra note 109, at 116; see also Hurd, supra note 106, at 958 (“One must
intend to produce a ‘certain response’ in one’s audience . . . . described by J.L. Austin as
‘uptake.’”).
186. Searle, supra note 116, at 409.
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problematic. Such challenges generally assume any number of
187
possible hearers or readers; the court is concerned not just with the
speech’s effect on the individual plaintiff or plaintiffs but with its
188
effect, in a sense, on all citizens. This opens up the problem that
different speech acts may evoke different kinds of responses from
different hearers; the speech act of endorsement or proselytization
may be successful or unsuccessful, depending on how it is received by
a given speaker.
Ultimately, the problems evoked by the uptake requirement for
illocutionary acts simply reflect a problem inherent in language
itself—perhaps particularly in language that is sufficiently
controversial or divisive as to evoke varying responses among
different individuals. Whenever a court must determine the social
meaning of a phrase, symbol, or practice, the question of whose
perspective is relevant immediately arises. This problem inheres in all
of the jurisprudence concerning official references to religion, and the
literature about government religious speech has already covered that
189
ground extensively. I have discussed this problem elsewhere as well,
acknowledging the thorny problems posed by the reception of the
speech among different hearers but doubting that it can be solved in
190
an entirely satisfactory way.
187. Cf. Hurd, supra note 106, at 980–81 (noting the lack of a specific “audience” for most
legislative utterances).
188. Indeed, the problem may be exacerbated by the fact that most Establishment Clause
challenges to religious speech are facial challenges.
189. See, e.g., William P. Marshall, “We Know It when We See It”: The Supreme Court and
Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495, 533–37 (1986) (“[A] symbol has no natural meaning
independent of its ‘interpretive community’ . . . . [Yet] the interpretation of symbols, and
perhaps religion itself, is inherently irrational.” (footnote omitted) (quoting Carol M. Rose,
Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 84 (1985))); Frank S. Ravitch,
Religious Objects as Legal Subjects, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1011, 1073–75 (2005) (“[G]iven
the nature of religious objects, there may be no possible ‘reasonable person’ to try to rely upon
in analyzing a religious object.” (quoting Neil R. Feigenson, Political Standing and
Governmental Endorsement of Religion: An Alternative to Current Establishment Clause
Doctrine, 40 DEPAUL L. REV. 53, 83–93 (1990))); Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and
Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the “No Endorsement” Test, 86 MICH. L. REV.
266, 322–25 (1987) (discussing “the problem of divergent perspectives” under the endorsement
test).
190. Hill, supra note 25, at 530–33, 539–44. Justice Thomas’s brief concurring opinion in
Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995), represents an
interesting example of a symbol whose meaning has arguably changed over time, but whose
meaning is complicated by the problem of uptake. Id. at 770–72 (Thomas, J., concurring). In
Pinette, which revolved around the question of whether the display of an unattended Latin cross
sponsored by the Ku Klux Klan in a public forum near the seat of state government would
violate the Establishment Clause, Justice Thomas agreed with the result—permitting the cross
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To some extent, however, speech act theory aims precisely to
avoid the problem of differing perspectives. As explained in Part
II.B.2, speech act theory assumes that utterances can have meaning
without reference to the intentions of any particular speaker and
191
without assuming any particular hearer. This kind of meaning is
often called “sentence meaning”—that is, the meaning that a sentence
has to someone familiar with the conventions of the language,
192
regardless of the speaker’s subjective intentions. Some theorists also
193
refer to this concept of meaning as “public meaning.” The concept
of sentence meaning does not deny that a particular utterance may
have different meanings for different hearers, but rather attempts to
bracket those meanings and instead focus on the meaning that the
194
“conventions of language” dictate for that utterance.
At the same time, I acknowledge that the meaning dictated by
linguistic conventions is not always determinate, particularly when
the subject of the utterance is a religious one, thus tending to evoke
differing viewpoints from different audiences. Nonetheless, I believe
that a presumption that facially religious phrases continue to have

on free speech grounds—but disagreed with the majority’s basic premise that the cross was a
religious symbol. Id. Examining specifically the Klan’s use of the cross throughout its history,
Justice Thomas admitted that occasionally the cross took on religious connotations but
primarily concluded that “[t]he Klan simply has appropriated one of the most sacred of religious
symbols as a symbol of hate,” and therefore that the case really did not “involve[] the
Establishment Clause.” Id. at 771. Recognizing the symbol’s use for racial rather than religious
subordination and intimidation by the Klan for the bulk of its history, Justice Thomas’s concise
but subtle opinion takes the position that the cross, in this context, has lost its religious meaning
through its repetitive use and appropriation in a variety of nonreligious contexts. Id. This
viewpoint has a certain intuitive force, no doubt in part because it focuses specifically on the
Klan cross itself. At the same time, it demonstrates how the Klan’s use of the cross to intimidate
and harass both draws upon and covers over the cross’s religious meaning, which waxed and
waned over time and perhaps reached its peak through the Klan’s association with southern
clergy in the 1920s. Id. But in any case, it appears to be the sort of symbol that has different
meanings to different audiences, depending not only on their race but on their familiarity with
the history of the United States and the Ku Klux Klan.
191. See Hurd, supra note 106, at 965 (noting that the “conventions of language are what
provide for the illocutionary acts which may be performed by the use of a particular sentence,”
and therefore that “[w]e need not look to the intentions of a speaker to determine the meaning
of a particular sentence uttered by the speaker”); Lawrence B. Solum, Constitutional Texting, 44
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 124, 145–46 (2007) (citing PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAYS OF WORDS
(1989)) (distinguishing “speaker’s meaning” from “sentence meaning”).
192. PAUL GRICE, Utterer’s Meaning, Sentence-Meaning, and Word-Meaning, in STUDIES IN
THE WAY OF WORDS 117, 124 (1989) (distinguishing “timeless meaning” from “occasion
meaning”); Hurd, supra note 106, at 962–67.
193. Solum, supra note 191, at 135 (quoting GRICE, supra note 192, at 117–37).
194. Hurd, supra note 106, at 965.
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religious meaning, which I discuss further in Part III.B, combined
with a focus on issues such as past social context and past divisiveness,
might make inroads toward minimizing the problem of differing
perspectives among different hearers. At a minimum, I believe that it
is a superior solution to other existing proposals, such as encouraging
195
courts to adopt the position of the “reasonable nonadherent.” A
presumption against certain kinds of speech will give courts a baseline
from which to determine the meaning and force of such speech—a
baseline that may well conflict with a judge’s inherent biases but will
likely align with the viewpoint of religious outsiders. Simply asking a
judge to step into the shoes of someone unlike herself, on the other
hand, appears to require an ill-defined act of empathy and is
therefore less likely to be effective. Law, by and large, works by
means of technical rules like burdens of proof and presumptions,
rather than acts of sympathetic imagination. A presumption that
pushes judges in one particular direction when they are in doubt
about the social meaning of religious government speech gives at least
some guidance in a highly contested case.
III. CEREMONIAL DEISM, SPEECH ACT THEORY, AND
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE DOCTRINE
A. Speech Act Theory and Establishment Clause Doctrine
My contention here is that when courts evaluate religious
references under the Establishment Clause, they are largely
concerned with the illocutionary force or effect of these references.
Likewise, speech act theory is geared primarily toward questions
about what people do—what effects they bring about—when they
196
speak. This particular orientation explains both the title of Austin’s
book and the almost exclusive focus of speech act theory on
195. Leading Cases: Government Sponsored Religious Displays, 103 HARV. L. REV. 228, 234
& n.46 (1989); see also Gary J. Simson, The Establishment Clause in the Supreme Court:
Rethinking the Court’s Approach, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 905, 915–16 (1987) (arguing that courts
should “focus[] on the reasonable perception of persons who would feel pressured and alienated
by the allegedly sponsored message”); Developments in the Law: Religion and the State, 100
HARV. L. REV. 1606, 1648–49 (1987) (“[A]pplication must turn on the message received by the
minority or nonadherent.”).
196. Gorman, supra note 106, at 102–03. Gorman quotes the philosopher G.J. Warnock,
who pointed out that Austin’s book “has almost nothing at all to say” about language itself;
rather, Austin “was willing simply to assume that we have ‘got’ a language, with a view to
getting on to the question: what do we do with it?” Id. at 103 (quoting G.J. WARNOCK, J.L.
AUSTIN 151 (1989)).
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197

understanding illocutionary force. Indeed, for this reason, speech
act theory is largely viewed not as a branch of linguistics but of
philosophy—specifically, of the branch of philosophy known as
198
pragmatics.
The jurisprudence dealing with religious government speech is
also similarly preoccupied with linguistic effects. It is, at its core,
concerned not so much with the sense and reference of certain
phrases, terms, symbols, or even practices, as it is concerned with
what they do. Thus, although the locutionary force of “In God We
Trust” may be obvious, and obviously religious, the illocutionary
force is not necessarily so clear. Is it an endorsement of religion, or at
least of belief in God? Can it be said to be proselytizing? Or does it
merely acknowledge the role of religion in the nation’s history? These
are questions about illocutionary force, and they are the questions
that are relevant to the constitutional analysis. And indeed, the same
is true for symbols (such as Christmas trees or crèches) and practices
(such as legislative prayer), at least to the extent that courts are
concerned with their social meaning—that is, with their potential
199
endorsing or proselytizing effect. Thus, although the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence regarding religious speech may ask the right
questions, it does not point to any clear methodology for answering

197. Id. at 103 (noting that speech act theorists have understood “[t]he notion of
illocutionary force” to be Austin’s “most significant theoretical contribution”).
198. It is fair to say that Austin’s book aimed to make a contribution not only to the
philosophy of language but also to the philosophy of action. See, e.g., L.W. Forguson, Austin’s
Philosophy of Action, in SYMPOSIUM ON J.L. AUSTIN 127, 127–28 (K.T. Fann ed., 1969)
(“[Austin’s] contribution to the philosophy of action was of great originality and importance.”);
J.O. Urmson, W.V.O. Quine & Stuart Hampshire, A Symposium on Austin’s Method, in
SYMPOSIUM ON J.L. AUSTIN, supra, at 76, 81–83 (discussing Austin’s aims to add to the
understanding of language within, inter alia, the fields of linguistics, grammatics, jurisprudence,
and economics); cf. SEARLE, supra note 130, at 17 (“[A] theory of language is part of a theory of
action, simply because speaking is a rule-governed form of behavior.”).
199. Because of its preoccupation with social meaning and the application of speech act
theory to theories of social meaning, this Article is also relevant to, and in dialogue with, a line
of constitutional theory known as “expressivism,” which considers the constitutional
implications of the messages sent by government actions—that is, of their social meaning. See
Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General
Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1504 (2000) (“Expressivism is thus an internal account of
existing normative practices, but one with sufficient critical capacity to exert leverage over those
practices and to indicate when they ought to be reformed.”); Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S.
Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and
Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121, 2128 n.23 (1990) (citing the authors’ “distinct
concerns with the expressive dimensions of actions”).
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them. Speech act theory may be able to provide some guiding
principles for doing just that.
One of this Article’s primary contentions is therefore not only
that Establishment Clause doctrine is primarily concerned with the
illocutionary force of religious references—and, as a consequence,
that speech act theory is relevant to their analysis—but also that the
cases and commentary dealing with such references come up lacking
in part because they are insufficiently attentive to the distinction
between locutionary and illocutionary forces of utterances. Thus, it
may be true that, as several commentators have pointed out, it simply
blinks reality to say that the words “under God” have no religious
meaning, in terms of that phrase’s sense and reference. Yet, it may be
true to say, in a particular context or setting, that the words do not
have the illocutionary force of proselytizing or endorsing religion.
Thus, much of the case law discussing the Pledge of Allegiance
revolves around whether reciting the Pledge is a religious or patriotic
200
act—again, a question about illocutionary force. Similarly, the city
name Corpus Christi has a religious referent—it literally means “body
of Christ”—but the illocutionary effect of the name, which is the
focus of Establishment Clause analysis, may or may not be to endorse
religion.
Illocutionary force is thus the focus of the Establishment Clause
inquiry in any case in which symbolic government acts, and therefore
social meaning, are involved. This fact is illustrated, to take one
particularly clear example, in a lower court case in which the
locutionary act was arguably absent. In Saladin v. City of
201
Milledgeville, the Eleventh Circuit held that the plaintiffs had
standing to challenge the word “Christianity” in a city seal on the
city’s official stationery, even though the word appeared only as an
202
illegible smudge. Despite the failure of the smudge to perform a
locutionary act, the court held that it could still perform an
illocutionary act of endorsing Christianity and conveying the message
to the plaintiffs that they were second-class citizens:
[W]e reject the notion that the illegibility of the word “Christianity”
on the seal as it is presently used means that these plaintiffs cannot
have suffered and will not in the future suffer any injury from its use.

200. See, e.g., Myers v. Loudoun County Sch. Bd., 418 F.3d 395, 407 (4th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he
Pledge, unlike prayer, is not a religious exercise or activity, but a patriotic one.”).
201. Saladin v. City of Milledgeville, 812 F.2d 687 (11th Cir. 1987).
202. Id. at 691–93.
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Although the district court and the City equate the illegibility of the
offensive word with the complete absence of the offensive word
from the city seal, the fact is that the word is still part of the
seal. . . . The fact remains that the word “Christianity” with all of its
connotations is part of the official city seal, and these appellants are
reminded of that fact every time they are confronted with the city
203
seal—smudged or not smudged.

The quoted language demonstrates that the court’s concern is
primarily with the effect, or force, of the word on the city seal, rather
than with its meaning, in the sense of locutionary force. Indeed, it
would be incoherent to speak of an illegible smudge as having any
sort of sense or referent. Moreover, the notion that an illegible
smudge can cause injury to the plaintiffs, sufficient to ground Article
III standing, again requires a theory that focuses on illocutionary
204
force rather than the locutionary act giving rise to it. Moreover, this
notion may be carried over to other instances in which a nonlinguistic
government practice—such as the display of religious symbolism or
the observance of religious holidays—is challenged on the ground
that it endorses religion. Although there is no locutionary meaning in
the typical sense, the illocutionary force—which I contend is roughly
synonymous with social meaning in this context—of the practice is the
true focus of the court’s analysis and the parties’ dispute.
Admittedly, this Article does not take a stand on which doctrinal
test—the endorsement test, the coercion test, the ill-defined Marsh
test, or another test altogether—is the appropriate one for resolving
Establishment Clause disputes regarding ceremonial deism. Rather, it
aims to assist with answering a question that lurks behind all of those
tests—namely, the methodological question of how to determine
whether the meaning of a challenged utterance has retained its
religious significance. The following Section thus presents several
guideposts for making that determination. The final Section then
attempts to apply these guideposts to some concrete examples.
B. Doctrinal Implications
It would be foolish to contend that the complex body of theory I
have just described can yield easy answers to constitutional
203. Id. at 691–92.
204. Cf. King v. Richmond County, 331 F.3d 1271, 1285–86 (11th Cir. 2003) (inferring an
emphasis on legal rather than religious connotations from the fact that the Ten Commandments
on a challenged city seal appeared without any text).
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challenges. This Section nonetheless outlines a basic doctrinal test,
centering on a rebuttable presumption of continuing religious
meaning, that incorporates the insights of speech act theory and
provides some guidance for judicial analysis of ceremonial deism. As
explained below, this approach breaks in many ways with the current
judicial approaches to ceremonial deism and the assumptions on
which many courts and commentators rely.
1. A Rebuttable Presumption. The proposal that courts should
adopt a rebuttable presumption of continuing religious meaning when
confronted with a challenge to ceremonial deism grows out of several
key principles of speech act theory. First, speech act theory’s
emphasis on illocutionary force over locutionary force suggests that
the presence of facially religious language should not, despite the
views of some commentators, automatically mean that the language’s
effect is religious. Courts therefore should attend not only to the
literal language itself but to the present force of the language. Of
course, most courts already take this approach when confronted with
challenges to ceremonial deism, but it bears repeating that they
should not be subject to criticism simply for acknowledging the
possibility that facially religious language may lack religious force.
Second, speech act theory teaches that meaning, although
vulnerable to change, has a tenaciousness that is often
underappreciated. The capacity of meaning to persist over time both
argues in favor of a presumption of religious meaning—to take
account of meaning’s persistence—and suggests the importance of
history and social context in determining whether a speech act retains
its religious force. Indeed, as described above, speech acts have a
tendency to be most effective when concealing the sort of history of
205
subordination or divisiveness that lies behind them. Utterances like
the words “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance, the national
motto, and the Ohio state motto are most successful as unifying
sentiments when they are presented as uncontroversial statements of
206
uncontested fact, not as divisive religious tenets.
Ten
Commandments displays are most likely to garner support as broadly
accepted statements of morality, and legislative prayer to appear as a
mere solemnizing statement of civil religion, when the suppression of

205. Supra Part II.B.4.
206. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
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other religious messages is ignored. Moreover, it is precisely the
phrase’s repetition and long use that works to create this apparent
effect of universal acceptability, while hiding its religious and
religiously divisive origins. As such, courts should be particularly
sensitive to clues regarding an utterance’s history. A rebuttable
presumption of persisting religious meaning thus counteracts courts’
tendency to ignore or paper over the history of religious division and
exclusion that continues to inform an utterance’s present meaning.
Third, speech act theory teaches that the speech acts of
“describing” and “acknowledging” may be far less neutral and passive
than they appear. The act of describing a reality may instead have a
tendency to create and enforce that reality; moreover, this danger
seems particularly acute when the describing is done in the name of
the state. This effect may be intensified rather than lessened by the
repetition of certain phrases throughout history, as that repetition,
too, may be an attempt to shore up the reality that the phrase appears
208
merely to describe.
Indeed, as noted above, describing and acknowledging are
speech acts like any others. And these speech acts are the ones to
which courts often recur when explaining why a particular instance of
ceremonial deism is constitutional. The legislative prayer in Marsh,
the crèche scene in Lynch, and the words “under God” in Newdow’s
concurrences are all labeled as merely descriptive, or as mere
209
acknowledgements of religion’s role in American history. Yet in
performing the act of describing, one is often simultaneously
constructing a particular reality. This is particularly true when
government speech—the voice of authority—is at issue. Indeed,
“[e]ven the most strictly constative scientific description is always
open to the possibility of functioning in a prescriptive way, capable of
contributing to its own verification [and] . . . help[ing] to bring about
207. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 164–68.
209. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 32–33 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring in the judgment) (twice labeling the words “under God” in the Pledge
“descriptive”); id. at 40 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating that the phrase
“under God is merely descriptive”); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (“We are
unable to perceive the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Vicar of Rome, or other powerful
religious leaders behind every public acknowledgment of the religious heritage long officially
recognized by the three constitutional branches of government. Any notion that these symbols
pose a real danger of establishment of a state church is farfetched indeed.”); Marsh v.
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983) (describing legislative prayer as “simply a tolerable
acknowledgement of beliefs widely held among the people of this country”).
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210

that which it declares.” Moreover, “[t]he effectiveness of the
performative discourse which claims to bring about what it asserts in
the very act of asserting it is directly proportional to the authority of
211
the person doing the asserting.”
In his extended essay on monuments and the changing social
responses to them over time, Professor Sanford Levinson gives
examples of how public monuments claim to represent the official
meaning of historical events, sometimes evoking enormous
212
controversy.
“[M]onuments,” he asserts, “are quintessentially
‘about time’ and who shall control the meaning assigned to Proustian
213
moments of past time.” Indeed, Professor Levinson notes that
monument inscriptions may “set[] out what might be called, in our
postmodernist times, the officially privileged narrative of the
214
events.” Insightfully, he adds, “One might well believe . . . that [a
particular] statement was designed more to create a desired state of
215
public consciousness than to describe accurately” the reality.
Finally, it is a relevant consideration that courts themselves
engage in official government speech and that a court’s attempt to
characterize a phrase and its history may itself fall into the traps of
papering over past divisiveness and attempting to construct the reality
it describes. “The law,” in other words, “is the quintessential form of
216
‘active’ discourse, able by its own operation to produce its effects.”
Mark De Wolfe Howe has pointed out, speaking specifically with
respect to the Supreme Court’s now much-disputed use of history in
Establishment Clause cases, that Americans “tend to think that
because a majority of the justices have the power to bind us by their
law they are also empowered to bind us by their history”; and indeed,
the Court’s assertions about history, like its legal assertions, often
217
become solidified in law and cited as precedent.
210. PIERRE BOURDIEU, LANGUAGE AND SYMBOLIC POWER 134 (John B. Thompson ed.,
Gino Raymond & Matthew Adamson trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1991) (1984).
211. Id. at 223.
212. SANFORD LEVINSON, WRITTEN IN STONE: PUBLIC MONUMENTS IN CHANGING
SOCIETIES 45–48 (1998) (discussing the controversial Liberty Monument in New Orleans).
213. Id. at 31.
214. Id. at 48.
215. Id. at 49.
216. Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field, 38
HASTINGS L.J. 805, 839 (Richard Terdiman trans., 1987).
217. MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 5 (1965); cf. Steven K.
Green, “Bad History”: The Lure of History in Establishment Clause Adjudication, 81 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1717, 1733 (2006) (noting that when the Court “endeavors to write an
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Likewise, the Court’s assertions about the religious or
nonreligious meaning or effect of certain phrases and practices embed
themselves in the doctrine, to be cited by other courts in the future.
Numerous courts, for example, point to the Court’s dicta to assert
that the national motto has lost its religious meaning over time or that
218
the Pledge is a patriotic rather than religious exercise. The
congressional resolution encouraging display of the national motto in
public buildings similarly refers to Supreme Court cases for the
propositions that “the motto is a reference to the Nation’s religious
heritage”; that “the national motto recognizes the religious beliefs
and practices of the American people as an aspect of our national
history and culture”; and that “the motto recognizes the historical fact
219
that our Nation was believed to have been founded ‘under God.’”
The possibility that judicial language may not just describe the
Founders’ beliefs but attempt to create one particular dominant and
official narrative of those beliefs—combined with the fact that
repetition of a phrase or a norm may be an attempt to reinforce its
meaning and counteract its inherent vulnerability—again gives reason
to be skeptical of courts’ assertions that a particular phrase
constitutes mere description or acknowledgment of the nation’s
history rather than endorsement of religion or proselytizing. The
printing of “In God We Trust” on coins or the insertion of “under
God” in the Pledge may be as much attempts to create a particular
religious sentiment, or to place a particular gloss on American
history, as they are mere neutral statements of fact. This recognition
should be particularly powerful in light of the fact that courts often
gloss over the highly contested history of such phrases. A rebuttable
presumption that a facially religious phrase conveys religious meaning
is justifiable to counteract these tendencies.
Indeed, all of the principles of speech act theory that I have just
outlined lead to the conclusion that courts should be more suspicious
than they currently are of claims that a particular government
practice has lost its religious meaning through repetition or the
passage of time. At the same time, it is the inescapable inference of
this Article—and the theory it has advanced—that meaning can

authoritative chapter in the intellectual history of the American people, as it does when it lays
historical foundations beneath its readings of the First Amendment, then any distortion
becomes a matter of consequence” (quoting HOWE, supra, at 4)).
218. E.g., Myers v. Loudoun County Sch. Bd., 418 F.3d 395, 407 (4th Cir. 2005).
219. H.R. Res. 548, 106th Cong. (2000) (citing Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 676 (1984)).

HILL IN FINAL

2010]

12/1/2009 6:11:56 PM

CEREMONIAL DEISM

759

change in some circumstances. I therefore argue that courts should
apply a rebuttable presumption of religious meaning to all instances
of ceremonial deism.
2. Rebutting the Presumption. The rebuttable presumption I
envision would function primarily as a burden-shifting technique. A
plaintiff challenging an instance of ceremonial deism would have to
show only facially religious language to get the benefit of a rebuttable
presumption of continuing religious meaning. At that point, the
burden would shift to the government to prove that the religious
meaning has been lost. The government could do so in one of two
ways. It could either demonstrate the absence of religious
illocutionary force, as in the case of place names or other genuinely
referential or citational phrases, or it could show that the
sociohistorical context contains no divisive or religiously oppressive
past that continues to inform the present usage. If the government’s
showing is unconvincing or if the plaintiff is able to undermine the
government’s claims, the utterance should be considered a religious
one. At that point, the court would apply the endorsement or
coercion test to determine whether the religious speech is
220
unconstitutional.
The possibility of rebutting the presumption—through an
explanation of the illocutionary force or a study of the sociohistorical
context—thus recognizes that in some cases a phrase may legitimately
lose its religious meaning. The jokes concerning the national motto,
though they rely on its religious origins, necessarily undermine the
religious sentiment to achieve their humorous effect. Similarly, a
court’s statement that “The phrase ‘under God’ in the Pledge of
Allegiance is unconstitutional” would not itself be unconstitutional,
though the phrase is technically an instance of facially religious
government speech. Finally, as discussed below, one might doubt
whether the city names of Corpus Christi and San Francisco, or
perhaps even the use of “A.D.” on public documents, should be
unconstitutional given the apparent lack of religious impact those
terms convey.

220. Under the Marsh test, it is less clear what a court should do when confronted with a
history and tradition indicating continuing religious meaning, as the Marsh test appears merely
to tell courts to look at history and tradition to determine whether speech is constitutionally
acceptable. In essence, my proposed approach is incompatible with the Marsh approach.
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The task of distinguishing these examples from the potentially
unconstitutional examples just discussed is a delicate one, but it is
possible. It seems that at least the first example could be distinguished
by the fact that the motto is placed in a context that undermines its
original meaning. To the extent it relies on that meaning, it does so
only to break with it. As for the second example, unlike the use of the
words “under God” to solemnize an occasion by drawing on the
religious sentiment itself, the use of “under God” in the hypothetical
holding described above does not rely on those words’ religious force
to accomplish the sentence’s effect. The sentence would have the
same meaning and effect if it referred to another, nonreligious phrase.
Finally, the city names of Corpus Christi and San Francisco, perhaps
221
like the term “A.D,” seem to act not as assertions of facts or
religious values but as placeholders—arbitrary referents that specify a
time or place—for which another name could easily be substituted
222
without changing its overall illocutionary force. Thus, a rebuttable
presumption should be sufficient to convey skepticism about claims
that certain phrases are simply describing, acknowledging, or
referring to historical facts, while leaving room to uphold those
facially religious terms that legitimately do merely refer or otherwise
lack true religious force.
Moreover, speech act theory suggests the importance of history
and social context in analyzing meaning and therefore rebutting the
presumption of religiosity. According to contemporary theories of
language, “meaning . . . [is] historical through and through, produced
in processes of contextualization, decontextualization, and
223
recontextualization.” For the most part, however, courts have not
used history in appropriate ways. Rather, as described above, they
often simply have noted the frequency of a particular term or
practice, or the ubiquity of the Framers’ religious practices and
religious acknowledgement in general, drawing from these facts
conclusions about the constitutionality of specific practices. Yet this
sort of historical approach is overly simplistic and fails to capture the
genuine historical quality of meaning. Moreover, such history
proceeds by “interpreting the supposedly less complex and
221. See infra Part III.C.3.
222. The referential placeholder nature of city names may be contrasted with the Sixth
Circuit’s attempt to place the Ohio motto, “With God All Things Are Possible,” in the same
framework in ACLU of Ohio. The motto could not be replaced by Yogi Berra’s aphorism “It
ain’t over ‘til it’s over” and continue to have the exact same meaning and illocutionary force.
223. CULLER, supra note 114, at 128.

HILL IN FINAL

2010]

12/1/2009 6:11:56 PM

CEREMONIAL DEISM

761

ambiguous texts of a period,” assuming a purity and clarity of motives
and understandings in an earlier time, in contrast with the present
224
day.
Rather than engaging in what Steven Green has called “general
history,” by which courts “extrapolat[e] meaning from general
historical facts removed from their context and announc[e] their
commanding relevance for current practices,” courts must engage in a
specific historical examination that includes consideration of the
225
sociohistorical context of the term or practice at issue. That is to say,
the history used by courts to determine meaning should be both
specific to the term or practice at issue, rather than drawing on
sweeping historical narratives, and attentive to issues of power and
social subordination. In this way, courts can use the history to
understand the social meaning of the term itself, not just to draw a
conclusion about its constitutionality by analogizing to other
historical practices or by means of an “any more than” test.
The need for specificity can be derived from the lessons of
speech act theory. Speech act theory focuses on the illocutionary
effects produced by a particular locutionary act and on the history of
usages of a particular term. Speech act theory demonstrates the ways
in which different social or historical contexts can change the
meanings of a given utterance. In addition, it emphasizes the
necessary conventionality and repeatability of speech acts, such that
the same speech act must be recognizable in different contexts or
when used by different speakers. Thus, although the broader context
in which the term is mobilized will always come into play, the focus
226
must always be on the specific term or practice at issue.
Thus, the historical approach should examine, to the extent
possible, the sociohistorical context of the term, practice, or symbol,
with attention to the power relations it might imply. Because the
various usages to which a term has historically been put inform the
current illocutionary force, attention should be paid to these past
usages—including their religious or nonreligious nature and the
presence or absence of subordination of certain religious groups. This
would entail consideration of whether in the past the phrase has been

224. Id. at 129.
225. Green, supra note 217, at 1725, 1732.
226. Cf. Conkle, supra note 105, at 335 (discussing different levels of generality at which
history and tradition may be examined in Establishment Clause inquiries and appearing to
prefer the more specific approach).
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divisive, has been used as an endorsement of a particular religious
belief, and has had the effect of oppressing religious minorities. It
would also be important to consider whether there is something about
the current usage of the phrase that suggests it is being used in a way
that deviates or breaks from past usages. As noted above, there is a
particular tendency in cases dealing with ceremonial deism to paper
over a history of religious strife and oppression.
Some of the Justices have suggested—most prominently in the
recent Decalogue decisions, McCreary County v. ACLU and Van
227
Orden v. Perry —that the present or recent divisiveness of a religious
symbol is particularly relevant to its constitutionality. This approach
228
has been much criticized. Indeed, the notion that a lack of present
divisiveness may prove that a symbol is constitutionally
unproblematic recalls the suggestion that the performative succeeds
“to the extent that it draws on and covers over the constitutive
229
The lack of present
conventions by which it is mobilized.”
divisiveness, in other words, may only indicate the success with which
the symbol, practice, or term has covered over the power dynamics
from which it arose and from which it continues to draw its force. The
focus on sociohistorical context urged by this Article therefore would
not consider (or would not only consider) present divisiveness, but
rather past divisiveness and indications of religious subordination
associated with the disputed symbol.
An opinion that exemplifies this approach is Justice Brennan’s
dissent in Lynch v. Donnelly. Justice Brennan’s dissent criticized the
majority opinion in that case for drawing on the general history of
religious acknowledgement by official entities in upholding a nativity
230
scene display erected by a municipality at Christmastime. Justice
Brennan focused on the history of both public celebration of
Christmas and nativity scenes—“the special history of the practice
under review”—and concluded that the public celebration of

227. McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 876 (2005); Van Orden v. Perry, 545
U.S. 677, 702–04 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 709 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Of these opinions, the most remarked upon is Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Van
Orden, because he appeared to elevate divisiveness to the level of an actual test for determining
the outcome in Establishment Clause cases.
228. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Why Justice Breyer Was Wrong in Van Orden v. Perry, 14
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1, 3–4 (2005); Richard W. Garnett, Religion, Division, and the First
Amendment, 94 GEO. L.J. 1667, 1707–08 (2006).
229. BUTLER, supra note 130, at 51; BUTLER, supra note 137, at 227.
230. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 705–20 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Christmas and various aspects of the holiday’s symbology had been a
source of divisiveness among Christian sects until approximately the
231
Justice Brennan’s dissent is aimed
mid-nineteenth century.
primarily at refuting the majority’s argument that Christmas
celebrations and displays were constitutionally uncontroversial
because of a historical practice of religious acknowledgement
232
embraced by the Founders, rather than at attempting to determine
the symbols’ illocutionary force, so it does not necessarily answer the
questions that this Article advocates considering. Nonetheless, it
displays the sort of attention to social history—noting, for example,
the tensions between the Puritans and the Catholics that the public
celebration of Christmas evoked—that is largely lacking from other
opinions dealing with official religious speech.
Similarly, a recent article by Professor Christopher Lund sheds
serious doubt on the Marsh Court’s suggestion that legislative prayer,
as practiced throughout the nation’s history, is and always has been
233
innocuous and uncontroversial. Although the practice of legislative
prayer at the federal congressional level is indeed one of long
standing, Professor Lund demonstrates through detailed historical
234
analysis that it has been mired in controversy from its inception.
The sectarian divisions and power struggles surrounding the practice
235
were acute.
Indeed, he concludes that the congressional
chaplaincies “were never tame or benign, never immune to
controversy, and never entirely insulated from the political culture
236
that surrounded them.” Professor Lund’s analysis thus gives reason
to doubt whether such prayers can be considered simple
237
acknowledgements of the nation’s religious heritage.
Indeed, the extent to which judicial opinions ignore the history of
intense sectarian and political divisiveness surrounding a religious
phrase or practice is extraordinary. The majority opinions in Marsh,
Lynch, and numerous lower court cases tend simply to catalog the
multiple uses of a phrase or practice throughout history and to assert,
based on a superficial view of this history, that the practice has been
231. Id. at 719.
232. Id. at 694.
233. Lund, supra note 32, at 1214.
234. Id. at 1177–207.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 1214.
237. Id.; see also Post, supra note 183, at 16 (noting complaints about legislative prayer by
legislators in Nebraska and, as early as 1907, by legislators in California).
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uncontroversial and is therefore constitutional. Yet this reasoning is
classically the sort of papering over of the divisive origins of a
practice—drawing upon yet covering over its sociohistorical
context—that does not undermine but instead reinforces the
practice’s religious meaning by drawing upon that meaning for its
power and authority as an expression of local or national unity or
identity. At a minimum, this fact gives reason to doubt the truth of
courts’ offhand assertions about the innocuousness of a practice and
to instead dig deeper to consider the practice’s sociohistorical context.
Only by showing either a lack of illocutionary force or a lack of
historical divisiveness, then, should the government overcome the
presumption of continuing religious meaning.
C. Examples
The final section of this Article attempts to apply the principles
described above to concrete instances of ceremonial deism. Although
the analysis demanded here is admittedly case and context specific, I
hope to demonstrate that the insights of speech act theory may assist
courts in dealing with challenges to cases of ceremonial deism and
particularly in distinguishing among different kinds of cases.
1. Place Names. Challenges to the constitutionality of city names
like Corpus Christi and St. Louis are the cases in which the
presumption would most likely be rebutted. Although these names
have obviously religious—even sectarian—content, they do not
generally carry an illocutionary force that can be described as
religious when they are used as proper names to refer to long238
established cities. Indeed, the city names of San Francisco and Los
Angeles may carry with them many connotations, but religiosity,
sainthood, and angels are not among the most immediate that leap to
the minds of most Americans. Rather, those place names legitimately
may be understood as referring to—almost “quoting”—the origins of
those cities, which were often founded in tribute to a religious figure.
Indeed, it seems that place names simply function differently from
mottos or pledges: they are neither assertions of fact nor declarations
238. Under Justice O’Connor’s test for constitutionally acceptable ceremonial deism, which
considers in part whether the challenged phrase has sectarian content, the city name of Corpus
Christi would presumably raise some difficulties, although the other factors of her test
(“[h]istory and [u]biquity,” “[a]bsence of worship or prayer,” and “[m]inimal religious content”)
would presumably cut in the other direction. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S.
1, 37–44 (2004) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
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of beliefs but simple referents whose arbitrariness is more or less
239
assumed by those who use them.
Religious city names thus may be one instance in which a term
has legitimately lost its religious meaning. Although they contain
facially religious language, one may doubt that those names still carry
religious force. And indeed, speech act theory assists in reaching this
conclusion. Although a plaintiff challenging the city name of San
Francisco, for example, would have the benefit of a presumption in
her favor, an examination of illocutionary force, informed by
sociohistorical context, should easily rebut the presumption.
Although some city names may in fact recall an act of religious and
political conquest, and although some names may be the subject of
some contestation, in most cases it will be easy to show that the name,
like most names, does no more than refer to the city’s historical
origins and the religious figure after whom the city was named. The
presumption of religious meaning could thus be rebutted without the
necessity of examining sociohistorical context.
Similarly, in a careful and insightful opinion, the United States
District Court for the District of New Mexico recently turned away a
challenge to a sculpture in front of a sports complex in Las Cruces,
240
New Mexico, that included three artistically rendered Latin crosses.
Given that the city name of Las Cruces means “the crosses” in
Spanish and probably originally referred to groups of crosses that
marked massacre sites from colonial times in the area where the city
was founded, the court sensibly noted that the crosses constituted a
literal representation of the “uniquely named geopolitical
subdivision”—a representation that is also found on the city’s official
241
seal—“rather than an endorsement of Christianity.”
Of course, if in any given case a city name were found to have
enduring religious meaning, it would still remain for the court to
determine whether that religious meaning rendered it
unconstitutional. A court would proceed to ask whether the religious
meaning is one of endorsement or coercion.
2. The Pledge and the Motto. In the case of the Pledge and the
national motto, it seems that the presumption of religious meaning

239. See generally SEARLE, supra note 130, at 72–96 (discussing the speech act of referring,
as in the use of proper names).
240. Weinbaum v. Las Cruces Pub. Sch., 465 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1122–23 (D.N.M. 2006).
241. Id. at 1132–33, 1149.
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could not be rebutted in most contexts. The government could show
neither that the practices lacked true illocutionary force—when
recited in schools or stamped on coins, they are not mere
placeholders or referents—nor that the sociohistorical context
informing those practices is free of divisiveness or religious
subordination.
It is difficult to ignore the fact that both the Pledge and the
motto are associated with periods in American history of intermixed
religious and patriotic sentiment—namely, the Civil War and the
242
Cold War. These periods were moments not just of generic religious
sentiment but of attempting both to assert and consolidate the
supremacy of God in the nation. And at least in the case of the
Pledge, the assertion of the nation’s placement “under God” was
accompanied by an intent to exclude and label as unpatriotic anyone
who—like the godless Communists—rejected the view embodied in
the phrase. As one commentator put it, “Jingoistic desires to paint a
vivid contrast in the Cold War, separating ourselves, claiming ‘God’
within ‘our’ government, for sanctimonious contrast with ‘Godless
atheistic’ Communism, made the deliberate appropriation of a
pervasive religiosity an irresistibly useful instrument of state
243
policy.”
Nor do the ubiquity and repetition of those phrases minimize
their religious effect, contrary to what courts have claimed. For
example, when Justice O’Connor argues that brief religious
references serve “the legitimate secular purposes of solemnizing
public occasions, expressing confidence in the future, and
encouraging the recognition of what is worthy of appreciation in
society,” speech act theory asks why and how it can perform that
244
function. Most likely it is because such references invoke a prior,
explicitly religious set of practices and beliefs, and thereby
“accumulate[] the force of authority through repetition or citation” of

242. See, e.g., Van Alstyne, supra note 12, at 786.
243. Id. Similarly, at least one historian suggests that the consolidation of Christmas as a
national holiday with both religious and secular overtones, celebrated almost universally, also
dates from the Civil War era and is in no small part associated with the post–Civil War search
for a unifying national identity. RESTAD, supra note 23, at 91–104.
244. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 36 (2004) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692–93 (1984)
(O’Connor, J., concurring)).
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245

those practices. The usage of those phrases relies on the religious
force of prior usages to accomplish the act of solemnizing or
246
expressing confidence, for example. Like the word “Christianity”
covered by a smudge in the Saladin case, the religious meaning of the
motto persists and continues to affect its audience.
It is thus precisely the intermingling of piety and patriotism—the
national unification under the umbrella of religion that is both
described and enforced by those practices—that is troubling from an
Establishment Clause perspective. Courts’ description of the national
motto or the Pledge as mere historical acknowledgements, like the
Lynch Court’s similar description of the public celebration of
Christmas, draws upon yet covers over the religious and religiously
divisive history of these practices by making them synonymous with
patriotism.
A presumption that both the Pledge and the national motto have
enduring religious meaning should not, therefore, be able to be
rebutted. They are not instances in which the illocutionary force is
clearly that of simply quoting or referring to a historical event, as in
the case of city names. And the courts’ treatment of these phrases
shows a distinct tendency to cover over a history of religious
exclusion, which is manifest. Thus, the government would be unlikely
to show that there was no history of divisiveness or religious strife
behind these phrases or to overcome the presumption against their
characterization as merely descriptive, rather than as normreinforcing. Nor is there anything about the context of those phrases’
use in the usual case that undermines or otherwise minimizes their
force. Nonetheless, a court would be free to decide that the religious
meaning, while persisting, does not rise to the level of endorsement or
coercion, depending on the relevant Establishment Clause test that is
being applied.
3. Anno Domini. A more difficult case is presented by the use of
the phrase “A.D.,” or anno domini, or the English-language
equivalent “In the Year of the Lord” on official documents. Because
the language is facially religious—indeed, it refers to the birth of the

245. BUTLER, supra note 130, at 51 (“If a performative provisionally succeeds . . . then it
is . . . only because that action echoes prior actions, and accumulates the force of authority
through the repetition or citation of a prior, authoritative set of practices.”).
246. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 306 (2000) (“A religious
message is the most obvious method of solemnizing an event.”).
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Christian savior—it would invoke the rebuttable presumption of
religious meaning. It seems that the government might, however,
succeed in rebutting the presumption by showing that the phrase acts
as a mere placeholder, a now-arbitrary way of referring to a particular
historical event that marks the beginning of the current era. The
phrase could be, and sometimes is, replaced by the term “C.E.”—
Common (or Christian, or Current) Era.
At the same time, however, labeling time with reference to the
birth of “the Lord” seems less neutral than the sort of verbal quoting
or depicting that occurs when a city name references a saint or a
mission that forms part of its history. The phrase appears to be
asserting a reality—that a particular historical figure was the Lord
and that time started anew with his birth—that is less neutral than the
fact that the city of Corpus Christi was named after the Roman
Catholic feast day on which a Spanish explorer first discovered the
247
area.
It is possible that the government could rebut the presumption
by showing that there is no history of divisiveness or subordination
concealed by the use of our common dating system. The plausibility
of this argument would depend again on historical analysis, but there
are reasons to doubt its validity as well. As the cultural anthropologist
Carol Delaney has pointed out, “[w]e think of the calendar as a
neutral kind of chronological record-keeping mechanism, but it is
248
actually a highly political institution.” Governments have often
manipulated calendars for political ends—to suggest that time begins
anew with a particular, foundational political event, for example, as in
249
the adoption of the French Revolutionary calendar. And indeed,
there is some evidence that the powerful act of designating time has
stirred some religious division. Jehovah’s Witnesses use only the
designation C.E. in their official publications, whereas the Southern
Baptist Convention has advocated retaining the traditional A.D. as “a
reminder of the preeminence of Christ and His gospel in world
history” and “a reminder to those in this secular age of the
importance of Christ’s life and mission and emphasizes to all that
247. City of Corpus Christi, History, http://www.cctexas.com/?fuseaction=main.view&page
=109 (last visited Nov. 1, 2009).
248. CAROL DELANEY, INVESTIGATING CULTURE: AN EXPERIENTIAL INTRODUCTION TO
ANTHROPOLOGY 88 (2004).
249. Indeed, the calendar adopted by the secularist French revolutionaries was intended to
be “very ‘rational’ and designed to counteract the ‘irrational’ elements inherent in religion,
specifically to break the hold of Christianity over the people.” Id.

HILL IN FINAL

2010]

12/1/2009 6:11:56 PM

CEREMONIAL DEISM

769

250

history is ultimately His Story.” There is thus a possibility that the
term retains its religious significance. Nonetheless, its use in
documents may or may not constitute an endorsement of religion or a
251
coercive religious act.
CONCLUSION
This Article begins from the intuition that not all forms of
ceremonial deism are identical and from the assumption that meaning
can change over time in ways that are relevant to Establishment
Clause doctrine. Drawing on speech act theory, it argues that the
iterability of language opens it up to a variety of possible meanings,
through which even facially religious language may lose its religious
force. This is not to say, however, that mere repetition or long use
always deprives a symbol, term, or practice of its force. In fact, there
is much reason to be skeptical of courts’ claims that a facially religious
practice has lost it religious meaning. The offhand way in which
judges often make the assertion is thus unsatisfying from a theoretical
and doctrinal standpoint.
This Article therefore proposes that courts’ analysis should rely
on a rebuttable presumption that a facially religious phrase or
practice has continuing religious meaning. Moreover, courts may
consider the illocutionary force and the sociohistorical context of a
term when deciding whether the presumption has been rebutted. If
the presumption has not been rebutted, courts should then apply one
of the relevant Establishment Clause tests. Although this approach
does not add up to a perfectly determinate test for challenges to

250. S. Baptist Convention, SBC Resolution: On Retaining the Traditional Method of
Calendar Dating (B.C./A.D.), http://www.sbc.net/resolutions/amResolution.asp?ID=298 (last
visited Nov. 1, 2009). At the same time, Professor Delaney has argued that the use of C.E. is not
particularly preferable. DELANEY, supra note 248, at 86. “But just whose common era?” she
asks. “Jews preceded Christians by at least a millennium and the two religions have surely not
merged despite the hyphen in Judeo-Christian. I find CE a euphemism because the common era
still begins with Christ’s birth and, thus, conceals the political implications.” Id. Professor
Delaney’s comment reveals another instance of drawing on and covering over the origins of a
phrase.
251. See, e.g., benMiriam v. Office of Personnel Mgmt., 647 F. Supp. 84, 85–86 (M.D.N.C.
1986) (holding that the use of the abbreviation “A.D.” on government documents is not
unconstitutional because the phrase is secular and because it “does not make criminal the
holding of any religious belief or opinion, nor does it force anyone to embrace any religious
belief or to say or believe anything in conflict with his religious tenets” (quoting Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961))).
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ceremonial deism, it is nonetheless a vast improvement over the
current state of affairs.
This Article does not provide a clear set of answers to difficult
Establishment Clause questions. Instead, it suggests an analysis of
ceremonial deism that draws on the insights of linguistic theory and
proposes a presumption that may serve to counteract the tendency of
courts dealing with ceremonial deism to fall back too easily on the
notion that such phrases are merely descriptive or used for patriotic
rather than religious purposes. In addition, it attempts to lay some
theoretical groundwork under a concept that has remained largely
unsupported. In so doing, it also aspires to remedy the distortion in
the doctrine that occurs when ceremonial deism is treated as an
exception that is subject to no particular Establishment Clause test
and no articulable standards.

